It looks like it makes sense for each agent to assure others that
he doesn't sell secrets cheaply. One way to do it would be to play
multiple games with different partners, and have all agents keep
track in which games the secrets were revealed cheaply. Then the
reputation of each player would be calculated as an average sale
price of all games where this agent played. This would give all
agents incentives not to sell secrets cheaply.
This may well be researched in the game theory.
I am taking a game theory class now in the MIT Sloan school, and
am continuously surprised at the great number of unconnected
approaches to the study of multi-agent systems...
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Alexander Chislenko <http://www.lucifer.com/~sasha/home.html>
<sasha@media.mit.edu> <sasha@lucifer.com> <sasha1@netcom.com>
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Received on Mon Mar 2 21:20:47 1998
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