From: Dan Fabulich (daniel.fabulich@yale.edu)
Date: Sat Dec 25 1999 - 23:21:23 MST
'What is your name?' 'Robert Owen.' 'Do you deny having written the
following?':
> about "quantum foam" and other esoterica. All I intend here is to urge you
> to avoid equivocation in the use of the word "possible". It cannot mean
> in principle that which may or may not occur, i.e. is a priori undecidable,
> and subsequently that which could not have occurred because it did not
> occur. Possibilities are either real latencies or merely temporary unknowns;
> quantum indeterminacy cannot, I believe, be reduced to the definite but
> currently potential outcome of some measurement of a variable which
> when performed will manifest its predeterminate value. Remember that,
> according to Heisenberg, the path of an object first comes into existence
> when we observe it. Or, if you prefer, forget it.
MY vision of a deterministic universe is in agreement with the so-called
Many Worlds Interpretation, which reminds me of the Stapp assumption
you've described above, but only if you want to say that the Everett
worlds are what the philosophers have called "possible worlds." MWI is
fully deterministic, in the sense that all of the world splits to come are
determined now by all of the worlds in existence today. However, there
are some differences between Everett worlds and possible worlds which, I
think, some philosophers would like to maintain. Certainly I don't think
we can correctly say that all true counterfactuals are making a true claim
about some Everett world, since I think we could make sense and say "it
could have been the case that the Everett world split we see today could
have been different." Similarly, I've seen models demonstrating that if
certain physical constants, which are the same in all Everett worlds, must
be within a very small range to support life. Yet we can still make sense
when we say "it could have been the case that these physical constants
were different" despite the fact that this is false in all Everett worlds.
> I find your continuing discussion of great interest. It is difficult
> to say "yes -- I mean epistemological possibility" because of the
> ontological implications of quantum measurement, or simply
> instrumental observation. I rather like the note by Heisenberg that
> what we discover is not "Das Ding an sich" but Nature exposed to our
> method of questioning.
Check out John Clark's "Waiting for Zed" if you haven't already, or check
out Tipler's argument for the Principle of Identity of Indiscernables in
terms of the Law of Mass Action. John Clark's Bob shows that the Identity
of Indiscernables is a necessary primative concept in order to explain
the Pauli Exclusion principle.
Philosophers often chide a "solipsism of we," but stuff like this makes
me wonder if there isn't something to the idea that there isn't anything
beyond what we can measure.
-Dan
-unless you love someone-
-nothing else makes any sense-
e.e. cummings
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