From: Zeb Haradon (zharadon@inconnect.com)
Date: Wed Dec 15 1999 - 00:31:20 MST
-----Original Message-----
From: Dan Fabulich <daniel.fabulich@yale.edu>
To: extropians@extropy.com <extropians@extropy.com>
Date: Tuesday, December 14, 1999 10:14 PM
Subject: Re: q*****
>'What is your name?' 'Zeb Haradon.' 'Do you deny having written the
>following?':
>
>> Your arguments might have any merit if qualia were something that were
>> postulated to explain something. If they were like quarks, or black
holes,
>> we could argue about the possibilities of their existence based on the
data
>> we have to support the qualia hypothesis. But qualia are not the
hypothesis,
>> they're the data. The entire world, all of science, every belief you have
in
>> everyday life are the hypothesis.
>
>I can explain my data in the same way I can explain Blackstone's magic
>show. You "think" that you're Thinking in exactly the same way as it
>appears that the dove appeared out of nowhere. It did not. You do not.
>
The difference is that you can show HOW it appears that the dove came out of
nowhere. You haven't come close to explaining why it seems that we have
experiences, and why they seem the way that they seem (or do they just seem
to seem to seem that way?).
>
>> If qualia do not exist, then the way we experience red, the particular
>> visual sensation associated with it, what is that?
>
>It's a nothing. You "think" it's happening, but it's not happening.
Why do I "think" that it is, why does this illusion of color experience seem
that way in particular? Why does it seem like anything, rather then a
blindsight-esque identification, for example (I hope you know what I mean by
this).
>
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Fri Nov 01 2002 - 15:06:05 MST