From: Delvieron@aol.com
Date: Tue Dec 07 1999 - 09:37:14 MST
>> There is more to behavior than just "preprogrammed behavior" and volition.
I assume by "preprogrammed behavior" Glen means stuff that is unlearned,
i.e., stuff that's in there before experiences. I bet most of us
associative conditioning -- the Pavlovian stuff. Pavlov's dogs were not
"preprogrammed" to salivate, but were trained to. Yet it did not seem to
require volition. I think, for the most part, octopodes are mostly the
same.<<
Ouch, ya got me there<g>. Yes, there is a whole spectrum in between. I
suppose what I should have said is that octopods show signs of problem
solving behavior, which goes beyond instinct and conditioning. In the
classic food in a jar example, an octopus who has never seen a screw-top jar
figures out how to open it. The octopod has a goal (get the food), and is
able to learn from trial and error in a relatively short time how to open the
jar using a novel behavior. Now, whether you think this represents
volitional behavior or not may depend on your definition of volition. I
would say that when something engages in a contingent, novel behavior it is
likely to be volitional, though the level of understanding may be low (but
never-the-less present). I don't know if this would meet your criteria for
rationality, however.
>>Of course, trying to pin down volition is a difficult (I do NOT believe
it's
impossible) thing. So, Glen might be right that octopodes have volition
yet not for the reason he gives above. (Granted, going beyond
"preprogrammed behavior" is a necessary condition for volition -- at least,
for volition that has an impact on behavior. If volition does not have an
impact on behavior, then I have no idea how to test for it.:)<<
I wonder, does conditioning also count as "programmed" behavior (granted, not
preprogrammed)? Just a thought. As for pinning down volition, it is
difficult. I know that in patients recovering from severe brain injury, we
use a behavioral definition for conscious, aware behavior, basically similar
to the one I gave above, which is contingent, novel behavior. Often times
the signal-to-noise ratio is rather bad when trying to figure this out in
patients (random movements may mask the behavior, fluctuating level of
consciousness may mean the patient's behavior is not always consistent,
etc.), so we use statistical analysis to see if the patient responses are
nonrandom.
>> I agree with the first statement. I gather the way to test understanding
is
to present the organism with puzzles of the sort that it will want to solve,
such as mazes to get to food or mates.<<
Yes, this is the way (see my examples above). However, how do you figure out
what and why it wants? I suppose by starting off with something hat it is
known to want and start offering a choice between that and other items.
Wouldn't it be interesting to offer repeatedly a choice between a simple
puzzle where there is food and a more complex one where there is not. If the
animal after a time started to show more interest in the more complex puzzle
when the food is clearly only in the redundant simple one, that may be an
indication of pure curiosity in the test subject....and that might be the
beginning of laying a foundation for justification for uplifting the species.
Another good indication might be if the animal practices behaviors it has
learned even in the absence of rewards (perhaps a hint that the animal might
welcome improvement in its performance). True, this is reading a lot into
these types of behaviors, but it is at least an attempt to understand life
from that species' point of view and guage crudely how they might feel about
uplift.
>> I disagree. The definition appears too ambiguous. In any discussion on
rights, the first thing to ask is Why rights? Why not do without them? The
answer inside Objectivist and some libertarian and classical liberal circles
is that rights are the means of defining individual autonomy in a social
sphere so as to allow freedom of action. For instance, my right to property
allows me to do what I want with my stuff regardless of what others want --
provided, of course, I don't use my property to violate their rights.<<
I tend to divide rights crudely into two categories, freedoms and
protections. The second one, protections, I tend to apply to more
individuals than I do freedoms. For example, an infant has many protections,
but virtually no freedoms. In my way of thinking, protections apply to
beings capable of feeling (and caring) about sensory input, whereas freedoms
require more understanding of the situation (and the ability to care about
what they care about?<g>). Also, to my way of thinking, responsibility goes
hand in hand with freedom (but that's another subject). So, for the basic
protection-type rights, I don't believe that rationality is necessary, just
subjectivity. I'm in a rush now, but will be happy to elaborate later.
>> Now this does not answer the question either. It merely defines fuzzily
what rights are for. Why would we need them? gets closer to the mark. We
need them because we need to live socially, materially, and long range, and
also since we are rational beings. (Dogs, too, are social and require
material stuff to live, yet they've not reached the point of drafting a
constitution and the like. Why? Because they are not rational -- at least,
not in the sense of a having a conceptual consciousness like ours.)<<
Humans didn't have any written code of laws at one time (and were still
rational in my opinion). I would guess that several species have "cultural"
rules of socialization which are learned from their family unit, but this
doesn't necessarily indicate rationality.
>>Does caring fall under this? I think it's easy for a being which is
nonrational to care. Territoriality (caring about something like one's
nest, food cache) and kinship/mate affection (caring for relatives and
mates) seems well demonstrated in many animals.<<
And I would say that we should respect these desires.
>> We could retreat to "reflective caring," but that does not help us, since
we need to know how to test for reflection. I submit that once we have
reflection, caring or no, we will have sentience.<<
I would argue that you still need to have caring, otherwise you just have a
knowledgable automaton. In my opinion, it takes more than being able to
model yourself to achieve true sentience...you must also have a model of what
you want to be.
>>Also, I submit that individuals have rights even when they don't exercise
their abilities. Thus, a guy who has the ability to be rational could own
property, be free to do as he pleases even though he is irrational --
provided he does not violate anyone else's rights.<<
I agree that the capacity is more important than the constant functioning of
that capacity, though I would argue that when someone is blatantly
nonrational, there is a role for curtailing freedom in order to preserve
protections for that person and others. It is where there is room for doubt
that I err on the side of freedom.
>> The species itself does not think. Members of it do.<<
True enough, but there may be a genetic bias for how members of the species
would feel about uplift.
>> However, asking them beforehand is impossible -- unless they are already
sentient, in which case uplifting would be redundant.<<
Does increasing the intelligence of already sentient beings then only count
as IA? In that case, I'm not sure it would be possible to truly uplift the
great apes (maybe not even dogs<g>).
>>Asking them afterward doesn't matter, since we won't be able to undo the
uplift and each on of them will be free to change his/her/its brain if
he/she/it wants to. I'm not sure that the uplifting party has an obligation
to undo the uplift, though I would suspect not.
Cheers!
Daniel Ust<<
Then I would suggest that the uplifter might be at least liable for providing
the means for reversing uplift, or if the desire to regress is considered
pathologic, then providing appropriate treatment. Can't just leave your
uplifts to fend for themselves until their on their feet, or tentacles, or
paws, etc.
Glen the very rushed Finney
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