Re: TO: Joe Dees - Mu-shin

From: Robert Owen (rowen@technologist.com)
Date: Sun Sep 26 1999 - 17:28:51 MDT


> > J. The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind asserts that the belief that
> > one possesses a self is a delusion; that the self is, in
> > reality, nothing.
> >
> > B. Let me rephrase this for the sake of illustration: No-Mind
> > asserts that the dreamer is the dream, the dancer is the
> > dance, the hearer is the sound, the perceiver is the

> > I have yet to see a waltz without a waltzer.

Of course I would reply: You have yet to see a waltz
without waltzing.

> > The perceiver is NOT the perception!

Petitio Principii.

I would suggest that the burden of proof is upon you: that is,
to prove "dualism" is a true theory of reality, and to demonstrate
how you know that. My statements are based on empirical con-
siderations; that is, I assert that the truth or falsity of any
proposition whose content is based on what cannot be experienced
is and must be indeterminate.

This is what Kant's "noumenon" was all about; since he regarded
"objective experience" as "phenomenal" (i.e. appearance only)
then like you he must also assume there is an "unexperienced
somewhat" of which the "object" is an "appearance". You, in
effect, keep saying "x is an appearance; ergo, there must exist a
y such that y is what appears as x", i.e. is a fallacious argument
involving Petitio Principii -- that is, you continually assume that
which is to be proved.

> > ...the presence of thought logically entails the existence of
> > a self who thinks (the thinker of the thought).

Petitio Principii.

> > If there is no dreamer, there cannot be a dream. If there is a
> > dream, there must be a dreamer. Likewise, awakening can occur
> > only when someone is awakened.

Petitio Principii.

> > J. On the other hand, if one does not possess a self, then no
> > delusion can occur, either, for delusion requires a self in

Petitio Principii.

> > J. There must be a believer for a belief to occur, and a
> > nonexistent belief cannot be deluded

Petitio Principii.

> > The eye cannot see itself, but its seeing refers necessarily to a
> > seer as surely as it refers to a seen.

Petitio Principii. Dualism is inherent in all Germanic and Romance
languages. "My eyes are blue." assumes the eyes belong to a
hypothetical somebody, i.e. your "self".

> > The epithet of "dualistic" is a common Zen ploy with which its
> > practitioners attempt to dismiss what they cannot refute.

To a certain extent, I agree; it assumes that "monism" is the case.
But the intellectual problem of "the denial of dualism implies the
affirmation of monism" is, again, based on the Law of Contradiction
and the Law of the Excluded Middle -- another dualistic Petitio Principii.

> There is a way around the conundrum, but you ain't found it yet. I'll
> give you another chance; if you don't find it then, I'll go ahead and
> tell you.

I haven't found it because it only exists as an epiphenomenon of your
illusory assumptions. I do not mean this disrespectfully: what is intend-
ed is simply the assertion that on empirical grounds neither dualism nor
monism are descriptions of experience. Further, the concept of "self"
has no experiential referent substantively but can only intend the vocal-
ized or sub-vocalized statement: "My self is thinking of itself" or "I think
therefore I exist therefore I think therefore...". By an "illusion" I mean
"that which is experienced as an image without any referent except
itself but is belived to exist in an assumed "external world", in other words,
a mirage. Again, Petitio Principii -- "external to what?" But that which
is "internal" of course.

Thus, the "self" is a mirage if taken as more than a cognition; of course
if you regard "external" things as "objects" then there MUST be a "sub-
ject" -- this is the first assumption of all dualism. If there is no "self"
then we are unjustified in saying either that it is "nothing" or "something".
In paradoxical form, "The self is nothing only if it is something." The
evident inconsistency of this statement underlies all the "ontological
arguments" invoked to prove the existence of God (or, in your case,
the "Self").

However this may be, if your "way around" assumes dualism, but asserts
logically that you cannot use "nothing" as a predicate "nothing" (c.f. the
Petitio Principii fallacy upon which all ontological proofs depend); or if,
on the contrary, it does not, then I would like to witness it for myself.

Thanks for the intellectual stimulation, whatever you are,

Bob (your hypothetical and undemonstrable correspondent)

=======================
Robert M. Owen
Director
The Orion Institute
57 W. Morgan Street
Brevard, NC 28712-3659 USA
=======================



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