From: J. R. Molloy (jr@shasta.com)
Date: Mon Sep 06 1999 - 17:24:39 MDT
Joseph Sterlynne wrote,
>If philosophy defines the terms used in science what, then, is the means by
>which these philosophical arguments are made? It seems that all
>philosophical questions ultimately become translated into scientific ones.
>This is readily apparent if one looks at the philosophy of mind literature
>today. But what is the argument that this is not happening or will not
>happen to that more general truth-searching or -defining sector of
>philosophy? That, too, is translatable into empirical terms. If you want
>to know the conditions of truth you have to know what the knower of truth
>knows. So you have to know the construction of the knower. For philosophy
>to judge the foundations of logic it must use some formal system. Which
>logic does it use?
In further support of your comments (IFSOYC):
Philosophy does not define the terms used in science. (Ex. gluon,
microtubule, quasar, etc.) Science not only defines its own terms, it
organizes them into a grid of empirically verifiable knowledge such that
anyone with sufficient intelligence and persistence can find out for
themselves, experimentally, physically, directly. Science discovers,
philosophy broods (IMNSHO). If you want to know the conditions of ultimate
truth, that very desire gets in the way of it. Self-knowledge occurs when
the observer becomes the observed. This surpasses logic and moves to direct
experience (i.e., science). You can verify this for yourself using what
subjective scientists generally call meditation (in English), which requires
no definition, only directions.
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