From: Harvey Newstrom (newstrom@newstaffinc.com)
Date: Wed Jun 23 1999 - 20:27:54 MDT
Christopher Maloney <dude@chrismaloney.com> wrote:
> In short, my view is that at every moment in time, our
> next moment is selected at random from the ensemble of all
> existing closest continuations. Max More has written about
> this in his dissertation, and I wrote him some emails
> trying to discuss it with him, but got no reply.
In short, I can see no reason to accept your view. You don't give any
evidence that this is true. You merely want it to be true so you can make
your later conclusions. You play some logical and semantic games to argue
that no one can prove it isn't true, so it must be true. Real science
doesn't work this way.
> Anyway, the result is this: uploading does provide a path
> for continuing our conscious selves. If the human is
> dissected and destroyed at the same time as being uploaded,
> then the consciousness will be transferred. But if not,
There is no evidence that consciousness jumps around and is not somehow
attached to our head. There is not even a good definition of consciousness
as a separate, detachable entity. It is merely a trait that our brains
possess. If you create another brain, it might also possess this trait.
There is no reason to postulate that some of that trait somehow teleported
from one brain to the next. The brain is also wet. Did some of the wetness
get transferred from one brain to the next? Or is it merely a trait of
brain fluid that it is wet, and all brains have this trait.
> Anyway, the result is this: uploading does provide a path
> for continuing our conscious selves. If the human is
> dissected and destroyed at the same time as being uploaded,
> then the consciousness will be transferred. But if not,
> then you will have two living human beings in the next
> instant. They will only be identical at one instant, then
> they immediately begin to diverge. Even if the uploaded
> copy were to have someone program the exact same experiences
> as the flesh copy was having, they would diverge. This is
> true because of the combined effect of quantum indeterminacy
> and classical chaos.
This is not the simplest and most direct explanation. This is the best way
to explain it to someone who is about to be uploaded to try to convince them
that their consciousness will be transferred to the new brain. It is more
direct to say that there is one person. You are creating a new person, and
are making the new person as closely identical to the old person. After the
new person is created, there are two people. If one of the people gets
destroyed, there is one person left and a dead body. Why do we need to
imagine quantum teleportation of consciousness between brains to explain
anything here? You are adding unobservable, untestable, unprovable
superstitions to make this version of uploading sound acceptable.
In reality, this example is moot anyway. If you made an exact copy, it
would be old or dying just as the original. Nothing would be gained. If
you made a better copy, wouldn't the consciousness stay in the old body
because it is the closest next step? If you destroy the old body, won't the
old person die? To assume that their spirit will survive death and jump to
the new body is about as scientific as expecting a religious afterlife.
I don't know why this question is so hard. If you make a copy, you ask will
the person feel a continuous stream of consciousness to the copy? I state
that since they are exact copies, both of them will claim a stream of memory
up to their current state. Nothing makes the copy more real than the
original or the original more real than the copy. The copy may gain the
person's consciousness by some definition, but the original does not lose
it. When the copy is made, there is no reason to devalue the original to
less than conscious and then destroy it. The only reason you require the
original to be destroyed the instant the copy is made is to keep it from
objecting that its consciousness remained in the original body after the
copy was made. There is no scientific rational to assume that killing one
person at the same moment another is create will cause a transference. This
is about as rational as believing in reincarnation, that is believing that
when you die you transfer into the next baby being born.
-- Harvey Newstrom <mailto://newstrom@newstaffinc.com> <http://newstaffinc.com> Author, Consultant, Engineer, Legal Hacker, Researcher, Scientist. > So if the original were not destroyed instantly, there would > exist two humans, who each wanted to survive. > > > Harvey Newstrom wrote: > > > > Emlyn, > > > > ... > > -- > Chris Maloney > http://www.chrismaloney.com > > "Knowledge is good" > -- Emil Faber > > >
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