Re: reasoning under computational limitations

From: Wei Dai (weidai@eskimo.com)
Date: Tue Mar 30 1999 - 18:20:53 MST


On Sun, Mar 28, 1999 at 06:22:44PM -0800, hal@rain.org wrote:
> I don't fully understand the issue here. Suppose I flip a coin but don't
> look at how it lands yet. I can assume a uniform distribution. But I
> can expend some effort, say, leaning over and looking at the floor, and
> learn what the coin is. At the cost of expending that effort I learn
> whether the coin fell heads or tails.

In the coin toss and similar experiments where uncertainty is caused by
lack of complete information, there are commonly accepted principles for
computing a probability distribution on the outcome and for updating the
distribution as new information arises. I am looking for similar
principles for cases where uncertainty is caused by lack of computational
resources (or better yet a combination of both), and arguments that these
principles are reasonable. I was hoping a systematic treatment of this
subject already exists, but since nobody referenced one it probably
doesn't exist yet.

Most people seem to assume that probability theory is sufficient to handle
computational uncertainty. I don't really disagree, but would like to see
some kind of formal argument that the approach is consistent and won't
lead to subtle paradoxes.



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