From: Dan Fabulich (daniel.fabulich@yale.edu)
Date: Mon Mar 29 1999 - 14:57:26 MST
At 10:00 PM 3/29/99 +0100, you wrote:
> Mike Lorrey wrote:
>
>> > Perhaps someone can clear something up for me. Does
>> > the MWI solve the observer problem? As far as I can
>> > tell it simply replaces the question, "why do I
>> > observe this state", with, "why do I observe this
>> > world".
>>
>> It answers that question as well, by random chance.
>
>So it doesn't answer the question.
>From the excellent Many-Worlds FAQ:
Q25 Why am I in this world and not another?
---------------------------------------
Why does the universe appear random?
------------------------------------
These are really the same questions. Consider, for a moment, this
analogy:
Suppose Fred has his brain divided in two and transplanted into two
different cloned bodies (this is a gedanken operation! [*]). Let's
further suppose that each half-brain regenerates to full functionality
and call the resultant individuals Fred-Left and Fred-Right. Fred-Left
can ask, why did I end up as Fred-Left? Similarly Fred-Right can ask,
why did I end up as Fred-Right? The only answer possible is that there
was *no* reason. From Fred's point of view it is a subjectively
*random* choice which individual "Fred" ends up as. To the surgeon the
whole process is deterministic. To both the Freds it seems random.
Same with many-worlds. There was no reason "why" you ended up in this
world, rather than another - you end up in all the quantum worlds. It
is a subjectively random choice, an artifact of your brain and
consciousness being split, along with the rest of the world, that makes
our experiences seem random. The universe is, in effect, performing
umpteen split-brain operations on us all the time. The randomness
apparent in nature is a consequence of the continual splitting into
mutually unobservable worlds.
(See "How do probabilities emerge within many-worlds?" for how the
subjective randomness is moderated by the usual probabilistic laws of
QM.)
[*] Split brain experiments *were* performed on epileptic patients
(severing the corpus callosum, one of the pathways connecting the
cerebral hemispheres, moderated epileptic attacks). Complete
hemispherical separation was discontinued when testing of the patients
revealed the presence of two distinct consciousnesses in the same skull.
So this analogy is only partly imaginary.
--------
I like this explanation. You might not agree with MWI, but it does at
least answer the questions it has set out to answer, correctly or incorrectly.
-Dan
-IF THE END DOESN'T JUSTIFY THE MEANS-
-THEN WHAT DOES-
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