From: Jfvirey@aol.com
Date: Fri Mar 05 1999 - 06:10:15 MST
I'm glad my criticism of the definition of extropianism has launched a debate
on the philosophical underpinnings of the movement.
Here are my answer to Max More's rebuttals of my previous post (I yield in
point 7, for those who want to know):
1) When I mentioned extropianism's "rejection" of libertarianism, I did not
seek to imply that libertarianism had been declared to be incompatible with
extropianism, but was merely acknowledging the fact that it had been rejected
as an intrinsic component of the philosophy and is now on an equal footing
with statist philosophies that advocate the initiation of force by the
government.
2) I do not perceive any contradiction between (1) my minarchism; (2) my
complete agreement with Anthony Garcia's position that extropianism should
remain anarcho-capitalist. I would be contradicting myself only if I
considered myself both a minarchist and an extropian-as-defined-by-Garcia,
since I would thereby be claiming to be both in favour of the minimal state
and of no state. But I am merely a minarchist, and I feel extropianism (with
which I do not fully identify anyway) has been betrayed by the recent
inclusion of statists who favour government subsidies to scientific research
and compulsory genetic engineering.
Max More's argument is that "if Anthony Garcia had his way, *you*, Mr. Virey,
would not count as an extropian." Well I don't care! I'm much more concerned
with the term "extropian" actually meaning something than with fitting the
label. For the moment, noone *is* an extropian, as the concept is not valid.
My point was merely that I am in full agreement with Anthony's principled
position, and feel completely disgusted (as he does) by the complete political
indeterminacy (i.e. lack of principles) of the new extropianism. In other
words: I prefer an extropianism I can have honest disagreements with than one
with which noone can disagree.
3) Max More's answer to my post finally revealed to me what is wrong with the
extropian mindset as he defines it: extropianism is afraid to stand for
anything definite, because it perceives any such stand as "narrow dogmatism".
I suspect that the rampant tolerationism and subjectivism of the movement
explain the espousal of such an epistemology as "pancritical rationalism",
rather than the other way round. The most blatant admission of the
tolerationist-inspired fear of clear, logical thinking is to be found in Max's
own admission: "I've been considering a more systematic and hierarchical
derivation of the current principles from fewer underlying ideas. However, I
feel much reluctance to heading in that direction, since it lends itself to
monistic and dogmatic system building." I am beginning to understand why such
balderdash as Robert Anton Wilson's "Prometheus Rising" is still in the
extropian top ten books: a book that advises people to blow up their "reality
tunnels" by smoking marijuana *cannot* generate the kind of carefully derived,
logical system of thought which Max accuses of inherent dogmatism.
4) I resent the implications of the proposition "since you seem to like
logic". I do not "like" logic. I consider it the sine qua non of valid
thought. As for Max's assertion that extropians in general are great
respecters of logic, my own reference to "those who consider logic a
tyrannical imposition on their minds" was based on a recent post by Joe Dees,
perhaps the person I dislike most on this list (I merely said I knew "some
members" of the list who thought that way. Therefore I can't be accused of
undue generalization. I could have been had I said "most (or all) of the
members of the list" were that way.) By the way: how can contempt for those
who thus reject logic be "misguided"?
5) To my question, "If I classify the books in my library by colour, I have
increased the order of a system, which makes my act "good" by extropian
standards", Max answers, "No. Your act increases extropy only if the resulting
order is useful to you in ways that improve your life." Aha! So the
enumeration of "components" of extropy (information, intelligence, order,
vitality, etc.) is only a list of *derivative* or instrumental values, whose
actual status as values depends on whether they serve a more fundamental one:
"the improvement of one's life" (life as the root of value? That vaguely
reminds me of something.) Why don't the principles say so? And isn't there a
contradiction in holding that (1) "extropy is only to be maximized when it
improves your life" and (2) that "the essence of extropian thinking is a set
of general values and attitudes, not a set of required
beliefs about means" (since maximizing extropy itself has become a means)?
6) Max states that my "intention is to attack, not to be constructive." My
intention was to attempt a reductio ad absurdum of the definition of
extropianism, which I believe to be invalid. I have had a love/hate
relationship with extropianism for about a decade. This means that there are
elements in extropianism I find excellent, and others I find utterly
repellent. Without the former, I wouldn't even bother to criticize the
philosophy. It is precisely the mixture of the two that I find depressing.
Since the very beginning, I've tried to develop a kind of rational version of
extropianism (read: "dogmatic"), one that would be immunized against the likes
of R.A. Wilson or F.M. Esfandiary, one in which no extropian would ever
proudly claim that "reason is without foundation" or that intellectual systems
and clear-cut ideas are inherently narrow and dogmatic. The problem is that I
could find no core in extropianism that would enable me to reject the more
offensive accretions as "anti-extropian", as I tried to show in my previous
post (just as Anthony Garcia won't be able to find any principle enabling him
to reject compulsory genetic engineering as "anti-extropian"). So my intent
was indeed destructive: I tried to destroy whatever could enable allegedly
rational people to put Wilson and Esfandiary on a pedestal, while dismissing
Rand as a second-rate, dogmatic thinker.
Max refuses to discuss the examples I chose because he finds them "silly". But
their silliness was dictated precisely by the form of my argument: a reductio
ad absurdum. I don't think he managed to prove that those silly examples
(whose force lies in their silliness) did not flow from his own definition of
extropianism.
7) I think Max's most fundamental argument is his rejection of my integration
of the three definitions that open the Principles. I have just reread the
three definitions and I do realize I have made a mistake in my integration,
treating the definition of extropianism as "the philosophy of the extropians"
instead of "the philosophy of extropy". Mea culpa: Max is completely right in
saying that "The definition of "extropy" contains no reference to "whatever
set of ideas is currently
held by..." any set of people". He is also right in saying that I was not
thinking carefully at this point. But this only dissolves a secondary part of
my argument.
"Extropianism" is still the philosophy that seeks to maximize extropy, and
"extropy" is still an invalid concept- one which does not refer to a definite
set of existents. My question is: what enables you to lump together
"intelligence, information, order, vitality, and capacity for improvement"?
What do these concepts have in common- i.e. where does their "extropiness"
lie? Would I be asking for too much if I insisted on a valid definition
comprised of a genus and a differentia, and including no more and no less than
the existents it is supposed to include? (I suppose some will find such
aristotelian correctness a dogmatic imposition on free extropian minds.)
And please also answer this question: if (1) extropianism seeks to increase
"extropy", (2) extropy means "the extent of a system's intelligence,
information, order, vitality, and capacity for improvement", then "extropy" is
extropianism's *basic value*. So where do you get the standard that enables
you to decide which type of "order" (or "extropy") ought to be maximized in
particular circumstances? You do need such a standard when you assert that
"Extropian thinking does not value just any kind of order in any situation."
8) Regarding my point on "self-transformation into a toad" and "More
dumbness", I was merely pointing out that "self-transformation" and "increase"
or "maximization" cannot be values in themselves until one has determined the
end of the transformation or the attribute to be maximized. For a very similar
point, see Rand's article on "Extremism or the art of smearing". I am sorry
the "More dumbness" example was interpreted as an insult. It was provocative
and definitely irreverent, but I didn't mean it as an insult.
Sincerely,
Jean-Francois Virey.
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