From: The Baileys (nanotech@cwix.com)
Date: Wed Nov 25 1998 - 02:32:27 MST
Eliezer Yudkowsky wrote:
>Suppose you make a recording of a Turing machine, and play it back - load
the
>state and tape from each tick back into memory. Is that an instantiation?
I assume the playback would take place on a Turing machine as robust as the
recorded subject since only a device equal in complexity could perform a
faithful playback. I'm further assuming that by "instantiation" you are
meaning that the process of playing back the recorded machinations of a
conscious intelligence instantiates that conscious intelligence (assuming
defined steps of computation are involved). If I'm getting any of this
wrong, let me know and I'll revise my observations.
The example above is not instantiation of a conscious intelligence. The
playback machine is not given the chance to experience its own consciousness
and allow that experience to develop its mind. The playback process,
assuming the recording was at the appropriate detail, would constantly
overwrite every connection, memory, heuristic, etc. There would be no
instance of consciousness in the playback machine. Once the playback ends,
however, and if the recorded mind is not deleted from the playback machine,
it could be conscious then. Going forward, starting with the final mind
state of the recording, the playback machine (no longer playing a recording)
would be a developing mind.
>Suppose you run the Turing machine again, except this time you compare it
with
>the recording and destroy it if it differs. Is that an instantiation?
This example appears to be instantiation of a conscious intelligenc, albeit
one in a very miserable plight. The difference with this example is that
the tolerance of difference, at least momentarily, implies the playback
machine is given the chance to develop on its own but only those
developments that compare with the recording are allowed to remain. A
similar scenario could be the ultimate form of mind control. You are
reading the manifesto of a new totalitarian group. This group happens to
possess the power to monitor every change in a mind and manipulate it if it
chooses. The group monitors your mind as you read its manifesto. If you
react negatively or reject a concept, they change your mind accordingly to
agree with the concept. You are conscious, but the trajectory of your mind
over time is constantly being adjusted to direct it down a particular path.
I found the analogy of a musical artist improvising a cadenza helpful in
thinking through these. An artist has been asked to improvise a cadenza on
a guitar lasting one minute. The artist does so, employing all of her
dexterity, musical knowledge and creativity. A recording is made of the
cadenza. Additionally, the cadenza is meticulously transcribed (every note,
nuance, timbre change, etc.)
Do any of the processes below exhibit creativity, i.e. instantiate
creativity?
1. Playing back the recording. Answer: Obviously no.
2. An equally-skilled musician performs the cadenza using the meticulous
transcription. Answer: No, the musician is employing musical knowledge and
dexterity but not creativity. The musician could employ creativity but is
not.
3. The original musician replays the performance using the transcription.
Answer: No, for the same reason as in #2.
4. A musician is told to improvise a cadenza, if his improvisation differs
from the original improvisation he is killed. Answer: Yes, the musician is
employing creativity. Whether the results of his creativity matches that of
the original musician is an ancillary concern. (Notably, this example does
not completely match with your "test and rewrite" example above but I could
not determine a neat cadenza example that matched well. However, using the
recorded mind, if another mind was allowed to develop and if it differed
from the recording it was destroyed, that would be a similar example. In
that case, the mind would be conscious because it would be allowed to
develop on its own, albeit closely monitored.)
Doug Bailey
doug.bailey@ey.com
nanotech@cwix.com
>If these processes are AIs, which of them are conscious?
>
>It's questions like these, admittedly carried a bit farther, that converted
me
>from my former position of Strong AI to a Penrosian noncomputationalist.
>--
> sentience@pobox.com Eliezer S. Yudkowsky
> http://pobox.com/~sentience/AI_design.temp.html
> http://pobox.com/~sentience/sing_analysis.html
>Disclaimer: Unless otherwise specified, I'm not telling you
>everything I think I know.
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