From: Bernard Hughes (bjhughes@istar.ca)
Date: Mon Oct 19 1998 - 14:19:16 MDT
Scott Badger wrote:
> (A1) if, as I believe he suggests, a part of my brain is constructing a
> best-fit storyline to account for the actions of other neural sub-
> systems, and
> (A2) if this story is a mixture of interpretation and confabulation, and
> (A3) if I perceive that *I* am the story being told by the story-teller,
> then
>
> (B) Isn't the notion of self an illusion? (and isn't this an
> increasingly
> popular theory among consciousness researchers?)
>
I don't think B follows from A. The description in A fits my current model of
how brains work quite well. But the "story-teller" is just one neural
subsystems. For me, concepts like "free will" apply at the level of interactions
between the subsystems. Observing that the subsystems are too simple to support
the behavior of the total system is normal for complex systems.
Its a pet peeve of mine that when I say that the human behavior is based on the
firing of neurons, some people jump to, "you think we are just a bundle of
neurons". The "just" takes out most of the interesting stuff about how the brain
works, and rather misrepresents my view. I like the "Society of Mind" model
which I think Scott is referring to. But I don't think it implies the brain is
"just" a collection of neural sub-systems. The "story-teller" may be an
important part of the perception of self, but without the other parts, it would
have no stories to tell.
Bernard
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