From: Bryan Moss (bryan.moss@dial.pipex.com)
Date: Sun Jul 19 1998 - 16:30:06 MDT
> John K Clark <johnkc@well.com> wrote:
I'm not sure if you actually think John wrote this
or you've just misattributed the message. I'm
going to answer your question regardless.
> > I don't if I'm pleased that you understand, or
> > infuriated by the fact that I've been saying
> > the exact same thing all this time!
>
> No you haven't. You said that the walls were
> the same, when you really meant that they look
> similar to the two participants.
I've said they can see the same thing, I've asked
you to prove (always in the context of this
thought experiment) that they are different, but
not once have I said they are the same.
> You said that nobody could prove the walls
> different, when you really meant that the two
> participants in the example would be prevented
> access to the tools to do so.
This entire thread was concerning a confined
thought experiment, not once did I apply any of my
questions or answer to anything other than the
situation in the room. It was you, not me, who
decided to post messages stating I had made grand
claims about two identical things being one.
> You said that consciousness does not reside in
> the brain, when what you really meant is that it
> doesn't have to remain in the brain.
I think this is something John may have said, I
have not said this.
> You said that consciousness does not reside in
> any location, when what you really meant is that
> consciousness is not limited to a single
> location.
John has said this, that consciousness is like a
number, or red, and has no location. I agree, but
I have not said as such during this debate.
> Every time someone proved you wrong, you
> clarified your position to be different from
> what you originally wrote.
If someone had proved me wrong, I would have been
the first to say so. What I have done is attack
the same experiment from different angles to try
to explain it, rather than just answer a
succession one-sided of questions.
> > > They will therefore diverge in thought,
> > > deed, or experience. The two people will
> > > think differently, act differently, or
> > > experience differently. They cannot remain
> > > identical.
> >
> > So if we've established that they will not
> > diverge in thought, deed, or experience, can
> > they act as redundancy?
>
> Read my statement more carefully. Your response
> is a non sequitur.
The statement from you was on exactly the same
subject that you had previously said you now
understood in your reply to John. Since you were
agreeing that in this situation they would not
diverge I asked the next question hoping that you
might have some consistency of thought.
> I am not the one who is miscommunicating here!
I think I may have confused you by quoting from
several different messages.
BM
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Fri Nov 01 2002 - 14:49:22 MST