Uploading

From: Bryan Moss (bryan.moss@dial.pipex.com)
Date: Thu Jul 16 1998 - 11:05:14 MDT


Let’s define a copy:

- It is an exact replica, atom for atom.
- It shares the same memories and personality.
- It experiences the same sensations.
- It displays the same behaviour.

Is the copy "me"?

Correctly phrased the question should be, "am I
the copy?" As I've said before, there is no
reason to make the distinction between copy and
original. It serves absolutely no purpose.

Imagine for a minute sitting in a symmetrical room
looking at your copy from across a symmetrical
table. You both experience the exactly same
sensations, you both react to them in exactly the
same way, and you both behave in exactly the same
way. You try to start a conversation, this is no
different from talking to yourself – you know what
you’re going to say, you know the answer, and you
"both" say it at the same time.

- There is no objective difference.
- There is no subjective difference.

This only leaves room for a mystical difference
and a semantic difference. I believe the problem
is the latter, and that's the reason we should not
make the distinction.

- Would a copy contribute to my own ability?

Having two versions of you that are exactly the
same cannot contribute to your actions (i.e. your
ability or power has not doubled). The copy will
display the same behaviour, opinions, and
reasoning as you, it will also experience the same
sensations as you.

- When a copy is made, are there two of me?

There is functionally one person. The senses can
be said to have the same spatial location (because
they recieve the same information) and subjective
experience will be identical. The number of
processors and the location of those processors
will have no effect on the subjective experience.

- Is killing a copy murder?

Let’s look at the method of replacing each cell,
one by one, with an artificial one. If, instead
of putting the cells in a pile, we arranged them
to recreate the "original" but leave them
inanimate, have we committed murder? Likewise, is
creating a copy (refer to the definition given
above) and destroying the original murder? Since
the copy cannot contribute anything to the
original (and vice versa) they can act as
redundancy, destroying one is not murder.

BM



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