From: Randall R Randall (rrandall6@juno.com)
Date: Tue Jul 07 1998 - 19:34:37 MDT
--
On Tue, 7 Jul 1998 20:37:02 -0400 (EDT) Daniel Fabulich
<daniel.fabulich@yale.edu> writes:
>On Mon, 6 Jul 1998, Randall R Randall wrote:
>John Clark's "Waiting for Zed" has a good discussion about The Identity
of
>Indiscernables: that if two things cannot be told apart from one
another,
>then they are the same. Take a look at this at:
>
>http://www.extropy.com/eo/articles/zed.htm
I will, thanks.
>> Right, except for certain purposes (which is
>> usually all that matters).
>
>Which purposes?
Those which only require that the object
perform in a certain manner. For instance,
we can say that two "Toyota Corrola" cars
are "the same", because they are
*functionally* the same. Even if they were
identical in every respect, down to the
molecular level, I am sure you would agree
that we really have *two* cars, not just
one that we are confusing as two. It is
convenient shorthand to say that an
object which is functionally identical to
another is the same, but we are now
reaching territory (uploading, IP, etc)
where it matters *to the object considered*
whether it is really the same object, or just
one which is like it. As far as I can see, I
agree with Harvey Newstrom's earlier
post on the subject.
>And for that matter, why should we adopt a definition of
>the word "same" which doesn't ever describe anything?
Well, I agree we need another word, but
until recently "same" worked perfectly
well as it was. :)
>I'd much rather say
>that any two things which can't be differentiated are the same and leave
>it at that.
Since we cannot differentiate your
copy of Phillip Glass' music from
mine, are they really the same
music, or can we separate them?
>> Since he has stopped having
>> thoughts indefinitely, how does
>> his plight differ from the same
>> stopping of existence without
>> copies? *He* is still quite dead.
>
>Except what's that thing over there having thoughts and (up until
>recently) indiscernible from the man on the floor? *Him*, I'd say.
I would say that that other person *may*
be the same person, if his consciousness
was not interupted in the transfer. If there
is a point at which there are two copies
in the same time, then at least one of them
is not the original.
--digsig
Wolfkin.
5CaaHx/ncmWI7mi94lMRbZ5naWfoiAiWyG37UUfee/P
bwrW3YPDws2rs7G+l+pYFvB7J2C5nK8xgJfsRQ1L
4SuJxq3Q7Ywqne7VODqLE+s5pwegYp4gb7dW4WO+e
wolfkin@flatoday.infi.net | ICQ: 3043097
E-Gold Acct: 100678 @ www.e-gold.com
On a visible but distant shore a new image of man,
The shape of his own future, now in his own hands.
| Johnny Clegg
_____________________________________________________________________
You don't need to buy Internet access to use free Internet e-mail.
Get completely free e-mail from Juno at http://www.juno.com
Or call Juno at (800) 654-JUNO [654-5866]
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Fri Nov 01 2002 - 14:49:19 MST