From: Daniel Fabulich (daniel.fabulich@yale.edu)
Date: Tue Jul 07 1998 - 18:53:19 MDT
On Tue, 7 Jul 1998 VirgilT7@aol.com wrote:
> I really hate to cut up your argument like this, but it'll probably save time
> in the end. I did NOT say that behavior provides zero evidence as to whether
> an object has mental states or not. I said that a ribosome would not
> *necessarily* act differently if CAU really meant something to it, that is,
> that it expressed a certain concept that the ribosome understood. It might be
> that the ribosome would think to itself, Oh! CAU! Okay, time start producing
> x protein...
I think you're missing the final step to John's argument: this means that
an experiment observing behavior trying to identify consciousness won't
"necessarily" work. If an experiment won't necessarily work on an
ontological level, then it's an experiment which can't work at all in the
scientific sense; the results will necessarily be inconclusive because any
results you get may not necessarily demonstrate consciousness.
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