From: David Bradley (ibradley@nauticom.net)
Date: Tue May 05 1998 - 21:49:01 MDT
This is my first real message to the list (ignoring that mail I thought I canceled).
I have been a life long extropian, but had not followed organized extropianism,
specifically, these transhuman and extropian lists, and the pages directly related
to them, until somewhat recently.
I have only been following these lists for several months, and I am sure that you
must have discussed these issues multiple times, but I have yet to become a direct
observer to one. So now I will share my thoughts, doubts, and ideas on the subject
for any who wish to respond. Any previous discussions I could search for in the
archives would also be helpful (i.e. specific thread topics).
I have, however, seen references to certain aspects of uploading and other related
topics in a number of discussions, and I am curious as to the popular opinion of
the list about certain aspects of the process, given the current knowledge/speculation
we have of it.
Since I have absolutely in no way had any first hand experimental experience with
how consciousness works in the brain or how it may be uploaded, I have only been
able to use logic throughout my years as a lone extropian to analyze the question.
So, I have settled my mind on a few logical variables. The most important, to me,
at least, is whether a consciousness or 'self' will be *passed* in the process, as
opposed to a *new* one just being added. Since, even though I like the idea of my
memories not being wasted, I'd much rather be there to utilize them myself.
So, if you will, allow me to analyze a few methods I've seen, or thought of myself
(not necessarily before anyone else did though,) for uploading.
All of these assume that 1) consciousness exists 2) the brain is the carrier/supplier
of consciousness 3) the brain does so through chemical and/or electrical means 4) we
have the ability to somehow manipulate this process to our benefit.
If I am wrong at all in my reasoning, please correct me. That is the first reason
that doing this, to further my knowledge. Other than that I am curious as to how
others logically back up the processes I see as improbable or impossible with my
current information.
Let me define up front what I will be *using* the term "original consciousness" or
"o.c." for. First, I am not at all implying that this is, or should be the accepted
definition of "consciousness," 'original' or otherwise. This is just *my* way of
saying "The Mind's 'I'" as it is popularly called. The part of the mind that 'hears'
the songs 'in my head.' The part that can recite poetry in an unspoken voice.
The part that people usually consider 'gone' when death comes (whether to another
plane of existence, to nothingness, or otherwise is irrelevant.) The part of the
mind that enjoys things. The part that is probably wishing that I'd just finish
this definition and continue the document. :) The "original" in the term refers
to the consciousness we all have right now (assuming none of us has already been
uploaded?) A second or 'n'th consciousness would be for anytime one can be called
my most 'conscious' after the first is lost either by death or purposeful upload.
'Total consciousness' is same as above, except stands for all consciousness-es a
person will have, summed together. In other words, every time they awake and
think, it is still a part of the same total consciousness, even if the first
"I"(or original consciousness) died with the original body.
(Are there more accepted terms for these two states?)
Also, for a few examples, I am comparing multiple copies of people, (i.e. gene,
memory, personality, and other aspects important to being 'them'). If two people
have differing memories after a specified point in time (i.e. when the copy(ies)
is/are made) that is irrelevant to my comparison (except for a small part that is
irrelevant itself.) If two bodies share the same original consciousness, they are
for the purposes of this discussion, the 'same.' For example: My original
consciousness is gone when my total consciousness was uploaded into a new
body. That new thing is not the 'same' as me, since "I" am now dead, even
though it has my personality, memories, etc. "I" am no longer in control of it,
or aware of it's presence. However, if "I" can control it, and am aware of it, it
is still me.
With this in mind, the questions of the 'o.c.' on it's transhuman journey now begin:
First, physical backup, using either true cells or mechanical devices of some kind:
*If the consciousness is both contained in, and produced by the cells of the brain*
(and is the reason you die if you do not get enough oxygen to the brain) one sould
be able to *logically* assume that:
1) If the cells are all taken away and the new system is implanted, that the
original consciousness *is* lost. There should be no more reason for the original
consciousness to exist than there would be for a person 'a' to still be living
in an apartment after 'a' has been replaced by person 'b'. The apartment may
still be a home (or the body may still have a consciousness,) but there is a new
'tenant.'
2) If the cells are replaced one by one (or slice by slice) the o.c. *may be*
lost. Either the individual must sit there and slowly die, or the individual
will sit there and notice nothing (perhaps some odd, temporary effects, but
nothing serious). (Just for completeness, a last possibility would be that
the process would interfere too much with the functioning of the brain to
be a viable form of uploading, but that contradict assumption 4) If the
former is true, it should hopefully be found in the first the process is
perform on. If he says, 'woah, I remember dying!' then that's probably a
hint. :) That is, unless the whole this is a blur, and no one finds out that
they die until they try it... Sounds like a bad sci-fi plot. :) The latter way
should work. To expound a bit: The only way that this would not work is
if consciousness could not expand to fit all the cells in a brain, which seems
unreasonable, especially in light of studies such as the one described at this
URL: http://neuronet.pitt.edu/groups/ctr-image/stroke1.html
I am sure that other type of studies have been made in this area that would
support this assumption. The only possible hurdle would be if genetically
enhanced or mechanical cells were used, they would be ‘rejected.' However,
there seems to be no logical reason (I am not knowledgeable in biology
enough to have any sort of authority on the subject, though) why the new
cells, or more easily, nanomachines couldn't, through certain chemical/
electrical functions ‘fool' the original cells into thinking that they are
normal, correct? Still, I suppose that since the body isn't being replaced
in this case that it is a temporary solution. So let's move on to more realistic
solutions.
3) If the consciousness is uploaded into a computer before it is uploaded
into a totally new body. This would not work, using the specific assumption
of this section. If the consciousness arises because of the actions of the
brain's cells, and is then contained within, there is no reason why it should
live in a computer. A computer is, after all, just a processor of information,
at least until some drastic design change is made. Of course, after that it
would no longer be a ‘compute'r in my, and I assume many other's definition.
Anyway, anything an electronic ‘compute'-er can do, a human ‘compute'-er
also can, with a good old sheet of paper (or a number of sheets), just much,
much slower. Now, if consciousness can be understood to the point of it
being used in a manner such as uploading, it should be able to be computed.
Even if not, let us say for the sake of argument that it one day becomes so.
The man and the computer would both work out the same results of stimuli
as per that specific consciousness's personality and other factors. So, the
consciousness would appear to exist, but would not necessarily exist.
Perhaps this could become an addition to Nietzche's "Baum der Erkenntnis?" ;)
4) Skipping the middle man, and using the method put forth in 2. If, for
our example a mechanized brain will be used, an enhanced brain were
connected to the existing one, could the consciousness ‘transfer' to the new
brain as if it were a part of the old, even if only a part at a time? For
example: the new brain only needed wires to connect it to the new body.
Nanotech machines are released along the wire and build the new brain
up from the wires, (which are inserted rather unobtrusively into the true
brain) replacing the original, through the cranium until it fully takes over.
5) Now, if 4 could happen, it's not stretching the concept too much to
say that one wire (‘a') could release machines of one device while the
other side (‘b') wire was constructing for another device. When they
meet in the middle, both are removed, and ‘a's configuration was added
to ‘b's, and vice versa. Hopefully the nanomachines would be able to
send this sort of information (configuration, chemical behavior, etc.) to a
computer or other storage medium also for backup, but immediately, for
the other side to use in place of the original cells to complete it's brain.
All said and done, two perfect copies would be made, and assuming that
all other assumptions made along the way were true, both should have
the original consciousness. How this could actually work is another
variable matter... Both are new consciousness (seems unlikely),
one is the original consciousness, and one is new (but what would decide?
Also seems unlikely), the consciousness could not just handle the
process and would behave unpredictably when it tried to expand to
cover both brains(covered later), or the solution I find most logical (even
if not very natural seeming): That the original consciousness would control
both brains. If the consciousness would expand to include the machines
as they took over, the process should continue until both devices meet
in the corpus collosum, where the o.c. is still controlling the brain as a
whole, even though it is but two devices communicating to each
other just as the lobes normally would. Here a computer backs up
the information of both sides. The lobes are then separated (each
respective lobe could be fed dumbbed-down reactions that the computer
is creating from the other device's backup, or even from the other device
itself, with wires connecting each other, and an area of nanomachines
used as ‘connections' to the lobe, passing the signals just as they
normally would be seen. Both brains could then be constructed from
the device halves, consciousness filling in as brain progresses in
completeness.
About the conscious controlling two disconnected areas, I assume that
at least some of you are familiar with Roger Sperry's experiments with
the slicing of patients' corpus collosa. If not, what happened was (don't
quote me): patients who suffered from extreme seizures had their corpus
collum, the connection between the lobes of the brain, severed, in the
hope that the lobe which fired during the seizure would not affect the
entire brain. He had great success with the project, and much was
learned about how the individual lobes processed information. However,
I remember a special I saw on TLC or The Discovery Channel, in which
patients who underwent similar (or the same) procedures would exhibit
conscious seeming behavior out of the person's control. (A part that
really sticks in my mind is when they asked a woman who had the
treatment to point to ‘yes' or ‘no' on a large card, in answer to questions.
In some questions, no matter how sure ‘she' was, one hand would point
to ‘no,' even going as far as pushing the other hand out of the way, and
quite consciously doing as much as possible to point to ‘no,' even covering
up the ‘yes.' Again, don't quote me on this, but that is what I saw.)
Perhaps other forces were at work, the cut was not preformed properly
or a number of other things, but this worries me a bit. I believe this had
to do again with the seizures, but I'm not sure. This was an area I was
hoping someone more information in. Any way, the corpus collosum
isn't really the sole connection which holds the brain together, correct?
(I'm not much of a brain guy, I do computers.) So it's not necessarily a
true split. Still, I see nothing that prevents this from happening so far,
and we are still operating under the assumption that the cells themselves
are the creators and holders of consciousness. Something tells me that
a reply will have already proved me wrong by now, but I will press
on none the less...
This section deals with an area unrelated to the task at hand, and
explores some variations that could possibly be made if the above
is possible. The chain of reason will continue again soon (it will
be commented as such.) Now, if we can fool brain cells into
thinking that a robot mock-up is ‘one of them,' then we could
possibly have odd changes in the design of this receiver. Perhaps
we could change around some x and y chromosomes and create an
opposite gender version of oneself... I don't know what kind of laws
written or unwritten will be around for thing type of thing, but you
know someone is going to try it. The o.c. controlling both a female
and male version of an individual would be.. odd, to say the least.
How would any offspring be setup? I would assume there would be
the problems that inbreeding would cause, or would it ‘transcend'
even that? That's a topic for thought. Either way, something tells
me that experiencing the act from both sides at once would be
ostracized socially, as masturbation is now, though. Besides that,
it's also adding the taboo of incest.
Off of that subject though, is a serious topic of debate. If genetic
rearrangement, ala the previous example, is possible, would it be
permissible to augment one's appearance in an upload? Most people
here would probably say yes. Some would probably say that is required,
at least if one wanted a certain level of advancement (Two legs? You
must be kidding!) Consider also, though, that if this type of multiple
consciousness is possible, then someone could also have multiple
personalities. This is not good. Spies, hired killers, and a plethora of
other such positions would be made much easier by just splitting your
consciousness into a never-before-seen body, through genetic engineering,
or any other way of creating bodies different from the original. This
new body could then kill all he chose to, and even if he died, it would still
leave the other portion(s) of the o.c., which can still resplit. The
tech will probably be set up so that the typical hired killer cannot have the
tech to just ‘split' at will, but this can still be easily misused. Also, it
should not be banned entirely. If I cannot chose a body for upload, I should
still have the option to try out both and get a feel for each, though
this could perhaps happen by just trying one, then the other. Besides that,
I would hate to have to have to deny everyone the ability to experience
two lives at once. Could you imagine that? That would be amazing.
Though I suppose that arranging the memories again would be a hard
enough ordeal to just leave it as an ‘interesting thing,' and there all the
memories would be lost, so what's the point... I suppose that if regulations
would be made, then it would just be easier to disallow it. Total banning
may not be necessary, though. Think about it... If someone is caught
after a murder or killed after a murder, you know with pretty much
absolute certainty who did it. Their memories would show who they
were, since they'd still remember their original life before upload. If
their memories were not uploaded (again, as shown in Roger Sperry
work, if the consciousness can't even access stuff with great certainty
from the other lobe of a possibly still partially connected brain, then
it certainly won't be able to from one being to the next.), then the killer
body would be nothing more than a personality clone, and the o.c.
would probably experience much mental turmoil, being possibly
120 years old in one brain and literally newborn in the other. If they
could somehow manage with total amnesia in one of their bodies,
I believe that body wouldn't be enough of ‘the original' to have an
important connection, it would logically seem to cause a true
multiple personality disorder. That leads into another interesting
area. Since the memories of any body would slowly differ from the
other over time, wouldn't the same process eventually happen? The
older an individual is, the less any memory changes what they have
believed since age 10 or so. I.e. between birth and age 10, every
day could possibly trigger a totally new way of thinking of the world,
but after age 15 or so, almost nothing will make you believe that a
certain race really *isn't* inferior to you, or that, if you think about it,
there's really nothing *wrong* with wanting to live forever. However,
there is the possibility. Many people here probably had such an
experience with Newtonian physics when relativity was introduced. It
probably caused you to literally think totally differently about your
world and how you perceive it. So, if one of my bodies was on a planet
around Proxima Centauri, and the other on good old earth, and the one
on P.C. talked to a real life extraterrestrial, wouldn't that cause a
severe clash in my mind's rendering of my bodies? The earth bound
body would have no stored memory of the existence of those aliens,
and therefore would not believe in them, when "I", the o.c., knows
from my P.C.'s body that they exist. The difference would be even
more drastic for someone such as our killer who didn't upload his
memories. The new body might learn a lot about ethics as it gains
the knowledge to survive, such as realizing that killing causes things
to not survive, which is the most important thing to this body now.
The new body might become *opposed* to killing!
Although, I don't have to experience everything to know it. If I could
somehow think in a certain brain at will, I could get those memories in
there. Then again, how would either brain ever be able to do that? I
suppose some more research on memory would be helpful. I suppose
it depends on how consciousness works. If I can realize something in
one body, and rethink that in another, I can have the memory in both.
This could also be a sort of collective consciousness if more than one
consciousness could inhabit a brain (as opposed to the other way around
as I've been discussing.)
Now, back to reasoning the mind out of the brain... If the
consciousness can be coaxed out of the brain into an electronic
device made of nanomachines, then, technically instead of hooking
them to a body, why not hook them to a computer? It works now, since
there is a place for the reactions and electric functions to happen. Just
all the stimulus is coming from computations in the computer... Here's
the chance for artificial reality.
So, if these nanomachine cells can emulate the original cells, then
shouldn't that mean that consciousness isn't technically in the chemicals?
Yes, this is pure speculation here, but so is the second of our assumptions,
that the cells are the cause/holder of consciousness, actually all four are.
So, if the chemicals don't necessarily make the consciousness, then
it's probably not the electricity either, since the nanomachines should
be able to be started again with no problems. If it is the original spark
that is the consciousness, then everything stops here. The machines
are turned off, but when they return, it is a new consciousness, just another
in t.c.., not the original consciousness. Now, if I remember right, there
have been people that have been ‘brain dead' and come back, with the
help of shocks and things. Does ‘brain dead' entail all action in the brain
ceasing? Does the natural electricity change at ‘brain death?' These
answers could help solve this part.
If all the above is true (working on four original assumptions (which
aren't IMO stretching it) and adding from there), then I have just
proven the original second assumption wrong. (This is a mighty *big* if,
though, and I'm almost sure that I am wrong.) However, if so, then
there is nothing making me "me." I'm not sure if that's a soul or what.
Think about this, if it is just the setup of my brain, when given a spark
(or if it is naturally there from the mother) that causes ‘me' to be, and
if that *can be changed beforehand* by nanomachines that ‘fool' the
original cells into giving them the consciousness, what is stopping my
consciousness from forming in your brain?
I think it all breaks down in the question of ‘individual' spark.
Logically, from the information presented (which, unfortunately is not
all) that seems the only place where trouble could strike. I really
need more info on the definition of brain death.
Well, I hope I get some replies (at least it will let you get your minds
off of gun control here for a minute or two.) Maybe I even touched
on something no one had ever thought of before. Maybe I blew the
whole "consciousness is brain reactions" thing out of the water.
Yeah, right.
Someone, please prove me wrong!!!
So, then, could random matter in the universe create another part of my consciousness?
Dave Bradley
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