From: Leevi Marttila (lm+extropians@sip.fi)
Date: Mon Nov 24 1997 - 10:48:11 MST
wolfkin@ldl.net writes:
> > From: Harvey Newstrom <harv@gate.net>
> > Does anyone know what is different between my understanding and that of
> > those who would be willing to die if there was a copy made of them? I
> > am curious to find out why I am not thinking the way other people are.
>
> Here is something to think about. If this copying and killing of one
> copy could be done, I think that the copy slated for death would
> quickly see your point. :) *Before* the copying was done, the person
> to be copied can anticipate being both copies, and so it seems
> pointless to worry about which one dies. Since there is only one of
> said person now, and since after the copying, there will still be one
> left, it seems that (s)he has lost nothing.
>
> BTW, there is a good fictional representation of this atitude in
> _Permutation City_ by Greg Egan. The main character keeps trying to
> perform experiments on uploads of himself, and can't understand why
> the uploads won't cooperate, even though HE has every intention of
> doing so.
If I would not get destroyed by jumping into volcano and pain period
would be short, I would do it now. So I'm not assuming anything
original would not do if he could survive it.
Why I'm thinking that I wouldn't be destroyed?
Two scenarios:
1) I'm tapping original in the head and saying: "I'm continuing living
here. So I'm not really dying when I jump into volcano."
2) Before jumping I would make backup of myself. After jumping I
would be restored. Restored copy would then study 'brain tapes' of
destroyed copy and try to understand how it feels to 'die'.
3) Actually case 1 is almost same as 2 expect that restore is made
before jump ;-)
Maybe there wouldn't be any new information but at least I could say
that I have died ;-)
-- LM lm+signature@sip.fi
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