Defining death (was:Re: spare parts and cloning ethics)

From: Max More (maxmore@primenet.com)
Date: Sat Mar 01 1997 - 12:12:04 MST


At 07:29 PM 3/1/97 +0100, Anders wrote:
>
>This seems to mirror the "neocorticaldeath" idea discussed in Hughes
>interesting essay (forgot the name, has uploads in it) about how
>technology changes our definition of death. He regards a patient as dead
>as a person when the neocortical functions are irreversibly gone, even if
>the rest of the brain works.

This is also the view of Karen Gervais in "Redefining Death". In my
dissertation chapter on conceptions of death I argued that this was a
better criterion, but not ultimately acceptable (as we uploading types
understand...)

I haven't seen the book yet, but am a little familiar with the writer (a
philosopher) and so think this may be good to check out:

  Death: Philosophical Soundings
  Herbert Fingarette

  Open Court, 175 pages, 1996. ISBN: 0-8126-9330-2 paper (also in hardcover)

Max

Max More, Ph.D.
more@extropy.org
http://www.primenet.com/~maxmore
President, Extropy Institute, Editor, Extropy
exi-info@extropy.org, http://www.extropy.org
(310) 398-0375



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