From: Robert J. Bradbury (bradbury@aeiveos.com)
Date: Mon Dec 02 2002 - 08:01:43 MST
On Mon, 2 Dec 2002, Avatar Polymorph wrote:
> Regarding Matrioshka brains: If you believe that uploading represents death
> followed by the creation of an atomic-lelel approximate duplicate, then it
> doesn't really matter much about the continued existence of uploads of you
> (rough approximations including memory) because you're dead. It more a
> cultural legacy or will following a suicide.
But I (personally), don't believe uploading represents "death" any more
than I view going to sleep at night represents "death". I happen to prefer
a more or less continual evolution of ones consciousness into an uploaded
state (i.e. most of your computronium/memory can be more easily replicated
than the current biological computronium/memory). But that doesn't
mean that I believe the disassembly of my brain and the reassembly of
an equivalent memory matrix on alternate hardware is equivalent to dying.
The information is only "lost" if it is allowed to decay away (or
is explicitly destroyed).
> Of course, you could upgrade your brain and then physically distribute it in
> continuously interlinked way, including through broadcast. Then only one
> area of your brain could ever be destroyed by a minor catastrophe.
This was the primary point my comments were trying to make.
> This does presume notions of continuity, potential and development being interlinked.
I'm reasonably sure that in the long run one has to slow down to gain
longevity. (Unless the speed-of-light constraint can be transcended.)
> Local hazard funtion: an interesting point. Fast cars and cars in general
> (and their fumes) threaten me every day. so too does slipping in the bath or
> having an accident at home. The fact that little is done to address these
> issues indicates that most people do not believe in science being at all
> feasible until it is actually right in front of them, that cultural history
> is strong in their behavioural patterning and that physical immortalism is
> not a prevalent belief system.
Agreed. But things are being done to address the local hazard function.
Seatbelts, requirements for fire alarms, elimination of second hand smoke,
regulations regarding food preparation, gun laws, etc. But there is a
question of balance -- at what point are the restrictions on activities
so unreasonable that they make life not worth living?
> It is also interesting to note that Tipler envisages a form of Matrioshka
> brain/s as a precursor to the Omega Point, which finally results in a
> multiverse with a divergency of life forms and approaches.
I'm not sure I'd completely agree with this. If you have some references
please forward them to me.
> Again, there could be differences of opinion about whether this (the
> Tiplerian version of the process) might be achieved through uploading
> or (continuity-friendly) upgrading.
My impression is that the Tiplerian version requires that one essentially
be able to run the universe backwards (to recreate everyone that once
existed). Someone please correct this if this is a misperception.
Robert
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