Re: Drawing the Circle of Sentient Privilege (was RE: What's Important to Discuss)

From: Anders Sandberg (asa@nada.kth.se)
Date: Fri Nov 22 2002 - 15:50:59 MST


On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 01:58:52PM -0800, Charles Hixson wrote:
> Anders Sandberg wrote:
> >
> >Multiplayer games of MAD has some interesting effects - the players
> >who doesn't participate in a mutual nuking will benefit (or at least
> >not be harmed), and might get a safer world. So it would be to their
> >advantage to get others to blow each other up (shades of James Bond
> >villains).
> >...
> >
> You should probably think again about the cost to bystanders. Some
> bystanders on the opposite side of the equator might get off easy in a
> very small nuclear exchange. Perhaps. But anything that escalted could
> have costs that are quite difficult to measure to ALL parties, whether
> or not they were participants in the conflict.

Sure. A likely payoff matrix for powers A, B and C (where C is assumed
to remain neutral would look like)

            Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 1,1,1 -100,-100,-10
Defect -100,-100,-10 -100,-100,-10

or something like that.

(of course the above scenario simply assumes that the effect on
bystanders are bad, not disastrous. A planetary war with (say) black
holes would be as bad for everybody. But even nuclear weapons, with
their horrific effects and fallout, are fairly local)

It would be preferable to C if A and B kept the peace. But this is just
the MAD game where the rational move for everybody is to cooperate. If
we include errors (a finite probability that a cooperate turns into a
defect due to insane generals or electrical errors) then the power that
did not participate in a mutual nuking would benefit by having the
threat of a nuclear war against itself removed or diminished.

That a failed MAD scenario is bad for the bystanders is clear, but it is
less bad than being a participant. And the benefit of being a sole power
is likely reasonably good.

Note that if the probability of somebody accidentally defecting is p,
the expected number of defections for N players is ~Np for small p - a
multilateral situation is more risky. Risk reduction can be added to the
payoff.

-- 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Anders Sandberg                                      Towards Ascension!
asa@nada.kth.se                            http://www.nada.kth.se/~asa/
GCS/M/S/O d++ -p+ c++++ !l u+ e++ m++ s+/+ n--- h+/* f+ g+ w++ t+ r+ !y


This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Wed Jan 15 2003 - 17:58:19 MST