From: Rafal Smigrodzki (rms2g@virginia.edu)
Date: Fri Nov 22 2002 - 13:46:48 MST
Eliezer wrote:
>
> Or in simpler terms, when I say that X is MORALLY WRONG, I mean that X
> seems to me to be wrong regardless of what I think about it, and the
> fact that an alternate Eliezer might be warped to think X was right
> makes no difference in that. Similarly, it seems to me that 2 + 2 =
> 4 whether I believe that or not, and the idea of being hypnotized to
> believe 2 + 2 = 5 doesn't change that, nor does the fact that "2 + 2
> = 4" is a cognitive representation somewhere in my brain.
### In other words, you deny the murderous Eliezer any claim for personal
identity with you. Although this is quite similar to the approach I would
most likely take with an analogously changed version of myself, I do see a
philosophical caveat of a very general nature - our perceptions and beliefs
can be wrong, no matter how strongly we feel about them. It is not
impossible that a type IV deity could actually make 2+2=5, and make murder
to be the right thing to do, but our limited minds are incapable of seeing
the rationale. Maybe with only a few dozen working memory slots more we'd be
able to glimpse the inevitability of genocide. Would you repudiate the
ultra-smart Eliezer (as measured by extensions of current cognitive tests)?
After all, if you tried to explain the idea of object constancy to the very
early, one-year old forms of Eliezer, you'd fail, yet you do accept as valid
the transformative process which brought you from that level to today's
brilliance. There is no telling where our paths will take us.
Rafal
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