From: Rafal Smigrodzki (rms2g@virginia.edu)
Date: Thu Nov 21 2002 - 13:11:31 MST
gts wrote:
> Rafal Smigrodzki wrote:
>
>> gts wrote:
>>> There is a lot more to Hugh Hefner's identity than his memories
>>> and data structures. There is also his face and body (old, but I
>>> hear the ladies still love it) and there is his property and his
>>> business empire, and his personality (which may or may not fall
>>> under your "data structure" category).
>>
>> ### The ideas you describe above are something new in this thread
>> - you say the material configuration of Mr. Hefner's environment
>> is a part of his *personal* identity?
>
> No, his identity does not include the material configuration of his
> environment. It does however include his own body and his own
> property. Certainly Mr. Hefner considers his body an important part
> of his non-nominal identity (especially given the nature of his
> lifestyle). And his personal property is defined as an extension of
> his person under law, as it should be.
### You seem to mean something different from most people when you are
talking about "identity" - now it is something that includes personal
property. Well, no surprise we cannot seem to agree.
--------
>
> No, I'm saying that if you want to be Hugh Hefner at time t then you
> must have and be everything that Hugh Hefner has and is at time t.
### So I need to buy a silk pajamas to be Hugh Hefner?
-------
>
>> ### Say, if I, in full possession of my mental faculties, decide
>> to open a direct and reciprocal neural link with my computer, and
>> exchange about 1% of my data, am I still me? What if I do the
>> same by reading and writing ?
>
> Yes and yes.
>
>> Now, let's say, instead of contacting my computer, I open a link
>> to Mr. Hefner (with his consent). Am I still me if I am able to
>> access Mr. Hefner's memory of publishing his first issue of
>> Playboy, in a first-person perspective? (of course, while still
>> aware of my own memories, and personal history).
>
> Yes.
>
>> What if we keep exchanging memories, with full mutual consent, to
>> the point where all our data structures are identical? At which
>> point (%-wise) does Mr. Hefner stop being himself (legally, in
>> terms of interpersonal relationships)?
>
> I don't believe he would ever stop being himself in this scenario you
> describe. He would merely become Hugh Hefner with access to Rafal
> Smigrodzki's memories. Those memories of yours might just as well be
> on DVD's on the shelf in his library.
### No, I wrote "our data structures are identical", meaning much more than
mere memories are identical. I meant the full content of subjective
experience. At which point does Mr. Hefner stop being Mr. Hefner?
-----
>
>> Do you see an objective yardstick for measuring such smooth
>> transitions, or would you rather agree that identity is, after
>> all, arbitrary, a matter of taste?
>
> As above, he remains him and you remain you, though each of you now
> has access to a lot more data.
>
> I suspect that your appreciation of his memories will far exceed his
> appreciation of yours. :-)
>
>>> Yes and I think this is the only correct approach. One's copies
>>> are not the same person, even if they differ only slightly. And
>>> they become more different from one another with each passing
>>> moment.
>>
>> ### It's OK if you see it as the only correct approach to your own
>> identity - but what I really want to know, is whether you also
>> think *I* am obliged to treat myself this way.
>
> Yes, that is after all the million dollar question.
### You dodged it. Would you use the means of coercion at your disposal to
stop me from claiming identity with my synched copies?
--------
>
> If you bifurcated into two people, Rafal-1 and Rafal-2, and Rafal-2
> committed a crime against me, then I would not hold Rafal-1
> responsible. I would consider Rafal-1 innocent regardless of what
> Rafal-1 thought about his identity. If Rafal-1 wanted to accept
> responsibility for Rafal-2's criminal acts then I would consider him
> deluded and take pity on him.
>
### Actually, this is good. It means I can spawn a copy, rob you, and enjoy
the loot, letting you take the body of the copy (which would self-terminate
after the robbery). I like your idea of identity, after all. It's useful to
me.
Rafal
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