From: Brett Paatsch (paatschb@ocean.com.au)
Date: Wed Nov 20 2002 - 22:08:37 MST
Anders wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 21, 2002 at 01:59:29AM +1100, Brett Paatsch wrote:
> >
> > Me either. I don't think there are moral absolutes, but maybe
> > there are moral "universals". A universal would not be true for
> > all time or in all situatuations (it would not be an absolute)
> > but we may safelty be able to apply it or assume its true for
> > nearly all persons.
>
> This is a good point. We can leave the realm of untouchable
> abstractions and instead look at what empirically produces the
> best expected returns. This doesn't rule out using abstractions to
> neatly chunk our knowledge in flexible mental tools, but the goal
> is to make living our lives better.
>
> > > I strongly suspect that the truth lies somewhere in the analysis and
> > > application of game theory.
> >
> > Me too.
>
> Me too. Game theory (especially the iterated prisoners' dilemma)
> was what made me libertarian in the first place. I began to see
> the power of self-organization and how constructive orders could
> be created by free agents.
>
> > An interesting thing about tit for tat is that it seems that
> > once one understands it one can benefit by teaching it or
> > showing it to others.
>
> I have always thought there should be a children's book about it.
Yes. We could give it to diplomats to read to their children at bedtime. :-)
>
> > I think this sort of thinking was behind Mutually Assured
> > Destruction (MAD) in the cold war. Seems to me we got through 50
> > years without a global war so maybe it worked. Or maybe we just
> > got lucky and in 999 other universes we all died :-)
>
> Actually, MAD is a slightly different game than the PD:
>
> Cooperate Defect
> Cooperate 1,1 -100,-100
> Defect -100, -100 -100, -100
>
> The whole point in MAD is that the only rational move is to
> cooperate - if I launch my nukes, you launch yours. Note that if
> there was no retaliation capacity the game would be "winnable" by
> striking first, so both players would have an incentive to strike.
> If there are many players things get more unstable, especially if
> we assume there is a finite chance of mistakes.
Yes. But the similarity I saw was that both rely on similar sorts of
"universal truths" about persons. They both assume the other can be rational
(and with MAD there seemed to be a concern in the minds of many folk that
rationality might be too much to ask for in all the links in all the chains
of command), and that the other values their life, and (picking up the
sociability side) as Sting put it "believe me when I say to you I hope the
Russians love their children too". I felt safer thinking their were probably
more family men in the missile silos and command structures then embittered
octagenarians looking to go out with some fireworks.
> Unilateral ABMs
> makes the cost of defection assymmetric, which in itself doesn't
> destabilize the game but makes attacks more tempting if other
> factors play in.
Yeah. Now we moving in on some contempory stuff. If attacks _are_ more
tempting, isn't the stability of the game decreased (though perhaps not past
the point of manageability which may be your point)?
With "nuclear terrorists" or non total nuclear war scenarios we really have
a different game. One that is more complex though less risky in global
terms, I think.
>
> > > It is amusing that the strongest religions are those where the
> > > ethics system acually works in the real world.
> >
> > I can't agree with this. Christianity is a pretty "strong
> > religion" by most accounts but many of the christian moral
> > precepts seem ideally designed to increase the number of "cheek
> > slappers" (turn the other cheek if someone slaps you on one) and
> > "shirt and cloak freeloaders" (if someone takes your cloak offer
> > them also your shirt) in the world.
>
> There are more things to this than game theory. People enjoy
> living in the high trust communities Christianity creates
Agree. But if the price of peace is eternal vigilance it would be nice to
share the duty watch with a few more folk.
> (remember that the late Roman empire was definitely a low-trust
> society) and get social benefits from them. Rulers are also highly
> motivated to promote such views, since they secure their temporal
> power better.
Yes.
> Finally, in practice people seldom behave like cheek
> slappers even when devout, but rely on social institutions
> embodying various forms of retribution (if you slap me, I report
> you to the cops).
Yes :-)
>
> > > Very often it turns out that these ethics are based on what is
> > > also a stable system in game theory.
> >
> > Maybe. Can't think of an example. "Eye for an eye" seems closer
> > to "tit for tat" than "turn the other cheek".
>
> Yes, but EFAE is too retaliatory. It produces endless,
> non-constructive vendettas. TFT and Pavlov are more forgiving.
EFAE _is_ to retaliatory. Is "Pavlov" a game named after Pavlov of
"classical conditioning"/"Pavlov's dog" fame or are you refering to the
phenomenon of "classical conditioning" itself?
>
> --
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
> Anders Sandberg Towards Ascension!
> asa@nada.kth.se http://www.nada.kth.se/~asa/
> GCS/M/S/O d++ -p+ c++++ !l u+ e++ m++ s+/+ n--- h+/* f+ g+ w++ t+ r+ !y
>
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