From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Wed Nov 20 2002 - 17:46:12 MST
Hal writes
> I think the MWI gives a false intuition in this case. I agree with
> GTS that if you use the MWI for the splitting, your chances of
> surviving are 0.001. This is equivalent to throwing say 10 quantum
> coins, and you only stay alive if all 10 are heads. From the MWI
> perspective this splits you into 1024 copies, only one of which
> survives. But prosaically we would say that you had a 1/1024 chance
> of survival in this case.
If by that, you mean that in common parlance we talk as though
someone's chances "aren't very good". For example, if the doctor
says that the person has a one in one hundred chance of surviving
the operation, then we should take it that the doctor is not
referring to MWI, even though he may be a stalwart believer.
If you pointed out to him that in one percent of the universes
the patient survives, and therefore survives *somewhere* he
would agree.
But now I see your point. The doctor (looking a little annoyed)
would retort, "well I meant that in MOST universes he will not
survive". In MWI we are to suppose that one's life stream
diminished by a factor of .99 when one takes a 99 in 100 risk.
In the duplication chamber, this follows only *after* the
initial copying. So in the duplication chamber experiment
where we are talking today, and tomorrow you enter the
chamber, then your life stream will be suddenly expanded
by a factor of 100 then diminished by the same factor, and
you and I agree that it's back to what it was. Whereas in
MWI, one loses an irretrievable .99 of all of one's life-
paths. There is tragedy in the latter, but not in the
former.
Thank you for pointing that out.
Lee
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