From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Wed Nov 20 2002 - 17:21:54 MST
gts writes
> >> Problem is that they are *not* totally identical at the instant
> >> of creation. At the instant of creation, each of the 1000 is
> >> observing a different outcome, 999 of which is disintegration.
> >
> > What? Then you don't understand *my* thought experiment.
>
> Your thought experiment is pure fantasy.
Are you *trying* to be funny?
> Even if we don't use MWI in our interpretations, the 1000 people
> would each be experiencing different realties and thus have
> different mental states. They are not "totally identical."
Sorry, but in, say, 10^-40 seconds, no one is experiencing anything.
It's ridiculous to assert that they are experiencing different
realities by then. Not one single neuron has had time to fire.
> It can't happen. At Planck time 1 there is only one person (Subject-0).
> At Planck time 2 there are 1000 alternates, (Subject-1 to Subject-1000),
> each observing a different outcome.
As I say, none of them are yet observing anything. But returning
to the point for just a second, at time zero there is one person
in the chamber. That person is you. Then at some small time
later (say 10^-43 seconds, if you like) there are 1000. You claim
that you (who did survive the first 10^-43 seconds in the chamber)
now still survive in only *one* of those 1000. The rest won't be
you. Why not?
> >> I'm glad you repeated this thought in this message because I
> >> missed the flaw when you first mentioned it. There is no
> >> assurance that on the day after the experiment someone will wake
> >> up in my bed at home. In fact there is a .999 probability that
> >> my bed will be empty.
> >
> > Wow, are we miscommunicating! In *my* thought experiment---and
> > I thought in your original one---the copies are all so close that
> > each thinks he is the same person as before.
>
> Of course each thinks he is the same person as before. They are all
> equally valid continuations of the original, with memories of the same
> past. But 999 of them die before they leave the chamber. I may or may
> not experience myself to be the one who survives, with 999/1000 odds
> against.
Then how could your bed be empty? How could there be a .999
probability that your bed could be empty?
> >> Those people are wrong, because they are not "all their future
> >> instances." They would experience themselves to live on in only
> >> one instance, an instance that would be selected by random
> >> chance.
> >
> > Yes, so you contend. Okay, well the one that *does* live on
> > assumes your role, no?
>
> Yes. Too bad for me that I'm six feet under.
Why won't the one who assumes your role act exactly like you do,
i.e., live at the same address and sleep in the same bed?
Lee
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