From: Jef Allbright (jef@jefallbright.net)
Date: Fri Nov 15 2002 - 10:21:48 MST
gts wrote:
> Jef wrote:
>
>>> The helicopter ride, of course. My odds of surviving
>>> there is .75 vs a miniscule .001 in your chamber of
>>> horrors.
>>
>> This is not logically consistent. Now you're saying that
>> there is something special, something uniquely you, about one of
>> the multiple copies.
>
> There is nothing special about me here. Under MWI, I will experience
> one outcome of an experiment and not experience the other alternate
> outcomes. The outcome that I experience is a matter of chance. The
> other alternate outcomes are experienced by alternate continuations
> of me in alternate universes. MWI is consistent without requiring any
> belief in souls.
>
> -gts
gts -
The scenario we're discussing is a philosophical issue wholly in the macro
domain. Invoking quantum spookiness obscures the issue.
The concept that Lee proposed, an incredible number of messages ago, was
about broadening our conception of identity beyond the one evolution gave
us, to accept that we should consider our duplicates are in some sense
ourselves.
It's not about changing our understanding of physics except the assumption
that we will have technology capable of creating an exact physical duplicate
of a person.
It's about changing our way of thinking about ourselves when this technology
becomes available.
This discussion has meandered all around the issue: whether two things can
ever be considered *exactly* the same on the macro and quantum level;
whether an entity can directly and immediately experience (in some
mysterious way, or through additional technology) the experience of his
duplicates (which was never the issue); whether time differences all the way
down to the Plank scale make any difference (useful in highlighting biases
and preconceptions, but also not part of the key issue); and now MWI which
imparts a kind of scientific/mystical air within which mysterious things
might be true... and on and on.
Again, the key issue was not about any mysterious physical properties or
interpretations of physical properties.
The original issue is the following: Assume that we will have the
technology to create a physical copy of a person, where each copy has all
the physical and mental attributes that we conventionally refer to as
defining a unique person. (As I see it, no one on this list has expressed
any problem with this primary premise, but only with what they think others
mean by it.) Then, Lee suggests, it will be useful to begin to overcome our
evolutionary and cultural biases and come to conceive of these copies as
extensions of ourselves, rather than as separate individuals.
Here is where the confusion and disagreement sets in. As I see it, there are
various reasons for the confusion. (1) Lee often writes in a way that
pre-supposes that people already share his understanding and use of
concepts. For example, he will say that he would experience what is
happening to his copies at other times and places. He is not implying
anything amazing here in a physical sense. He's just saying that we would
and should get used to thinking of all the copies as ourselves. (I'm not
saying we would or should, but I understand that we could.) (2) Lee appears
to sometimes enjoy putting a seemingly outrageous statement in front of the
group, and then coming back to work with all the objections and
misconceptions. Personally I think that's a fun way to get people's
interest, but in this case dealing with the results is really old. (3) Lee
seems to feel (and he may be right) that the best way for people to come to
understand what he is talking about, is for them to work through all the
layers and alternate pathways, much as he did over many years, but each in
his own way, therefore he doesn't make things as explicitly clear as one
might think he could. [End analysis of what I think Lee is doing/thinking.]
I may be overly optimistic, but I don't want to wait years, and I believe
people can make quicker progress by working together to clarify areas of
commonality and difference, rather than the kind of debate where one side
expects to "win."
In this particular case, please try to step back and see that the key issue
is a hypothetical one, and rests on a very simple basis, but one that could
have very interesting implications for our future culture. So far, we have
been spending an incredible amount of time on the basis of the argument,
mis-interpreting it in so many ways, and whenever anyone touches upon the
implications, the whole things collapses. Let's get agreement on the basis.
It's not what you think it is. It's simpler.
As I've said before, when two sides continue to disagree, and one side or
the other thinks the other side is crazy, it can be very useful to try to
paraphrase what you think is the other side's position. In this case,
neither side is crazy, but they've certainly been talking about different
things.
- Jef
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