From: Rafal Smigrodzki (rms2g@virginia.edu)
Date: Thu Nov 14 2002 - 14:50:45 MST
gts wrote:
> Rafal Smigrodzki wrote:
>
>> ### But how do you know which one is you?
>
> I'm sorry but this question makes no sense to me. I cannot see any
> other gts's so I don't need to decide which one is me.
>
> If one of them should suddenly pop into my universe (perhaps that's
> what you're asking) then I would see someone who looked like my
> identical twin. His personality would be very similar to mine, or
> perhaps very dissimilar to mine, but in either case he would not be
> me. If I pinched him I would not feel pain. He would. If he committed
> a crime then he would go to prison. I would not.
### I see you are not answering the question I asked - there are roughly 10
to the 26th power versions of gts which differ from each other only in the
direction of one electron spin. They are in a superposition of states. You
are saying you are only one of the eigenstates of this superposition. How do
you know which one are you? Obviously, you do not see the other eigenstates
but we know they exist and continuously interact with each other.
------
>
> He might share many of my opinions and thoughts, but then so do a lot
> of other people who are not me. My body and brain might even be
> partially a product of interference between universes but this would
> not make me less unique among the gts's in the multiverse.
### By definition of the problem, the versions I am asking about all have
identical thoughts. You are not unique among them.
--------
>
>>> Consider however that some of those other
>>> Rafals are undoubtedly so despicable that you would
>>> not even care to be in the same room with them, much
>>> less share their identity. Do you really
>>> think you are them?
>>>
>> ### If their thoughts are different to a sufficient degree,
>> they are not me by my definition of self.
>
> This is the same arbitrariness I see in Lee's argument about the
> Senator. What is "a sufficient degree?
### Whatever I decide. Remember, *my* identity is a question of taste.
-------
Am I Hugh
> Hefner if I think my thoughts are sufficiently similar to his?
### You may decide you are Hugh Hefner. I have no problem with it, as long
as you do not damage anyone's property, or infringe on Hugh Hefner's rights.
If your conception of personal identity does not unduly interfere with the
lives of other people, you can indulge whatever you want. I wouldn't deny to
you what I allow myself.
------
If my
> opinion on the question of my equality to Hugh Hefner is not
> sufficient to decide the matter then to whom do we look for a
> definitive answer?
### The courts, scientific opinion, your PCP.
------
And based on what criteria is that decision made?
### Sufficient similarity, and consensual agreement (you can't assume the
identity of a person who doesn't want to share identity with you).
------
> If enough people voted that I were a turnip then would I be a turnip?
### If the experiences of the majority of humans, their interactions with
you, prompt them to believe that you are a turnip, then most likely (by a
Bayesian reasoning process) you are a turnip. But, since you are
sufficiently different from a turnip, this is not likely to happen.
-----
>
> As I see it, it is much easier to acknowledge the common sense
> rational view that similar but non-identical people cannot by any
> means be the same person. It is a simple fact of logic that
> non-identical things are never equal regardless of their degree of
> similarity.
>
### There you go again. Seeing simple facts where zillions of atoms move
around, using tautologies ("non-identical is never equal"). Common sense
doesn't work well in the rarefied strata where we dwell.
Rafal
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