From: Rafal Smigrodzki (rms2g@virginia.edu)
Date: Thu Nov 14 2002 - 10:25:34 MST
John Clark wrote:
> "Rafal Smigrodzki" <rms2g@virginia.edu>
>
>> According to what he writes, once you prove to him he is a copy,
>> he'll say the original gts is dead
>
> I don't care what he writes you will never convince him that he's
> only 3 minutes old just because that's when the copy was made. He
> will feel like he's decades old, he will feel, correctly, that he
> existed last year.
>
> >Since it's his identity, he is the one to decide.
>
> Decide? This is not the sort of thing you decide and it's not the
> sort of thing you vote on it's the sort of thing you feel, and no
> matter what he is not going to decide to feel dead.
>
### It's best if we stop talking about gts, since in a separate post he
points out to me his ideas about self are different from what I deduced them
to be.
In a more general way, however, subjective conviction about identity cannot
be used in an unqualified way in legal and financial decisions. A synthetic
personality made to identify with gts would by your criteria ("the sort of
thing you feel") would have to be declared gts, and be able to sign
documents using his name. This would pose significant practical
difficulties. The subjective conviction of being old in a personality
synthesized from off-the-shelf memories just three minutes ago does not mean
that the personality existed last year. And BTW, there are some people who
are convinced they are dead, the Cotard's syndrome.
Rafal
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