From: Hal Finney (hal@finney.org)
Date: Wed Nov 13 2002 - 09:01:32 MST
It is plausible that Lee is right that the subject would soon come to
choose the 55, since he has no memories of his suffering. But what can
we conclude from this? In other words, what is the lesson of this
experiment?
The simplest conclusion is that forgotten experiences "don't count".
Unless you can remember it, it might as well not have happen. Hence you
should choose the 55 because the experience effectively didn't happen.
I don't think this is a valid conclusion, and I kind of doubt that
anyone would argue that it is. I won't go into my reasons for doubting
its validity unless someone wants to argue the other side. But it is
certainly an easy and quick conclusion to draw from the experiment.
If this is not the desired conclusion, then what exactly does the
experiment mean? Is it just an example of how people can be forced to
act against their best interests? Well, so what? People are imperfect,
and the flesh is weak. We knew that already.
Consider this variation. Instead of deciding each minute, you get to
decide and commit once and for all, beforehand. Either you will always
do the 10, or you will always do the 55 (or perhaps you could choose some
mixture, but I imagine that people would mostly go for a constant choice).
If you do the 55, you will have 55 seconds of suffering, then 5 seconds
of relatively calm, but somewhat worried anticipation of the suffering
that you won't remember. If you do the 10, you will have 10 seconds
of suffering, then 50 seconds of anguish, remembering the pain and
knowing that it will begin again shortly.
A plausible decision approach is to consider which alternative has the
greater average happiness, over the course of each minute. Again,
we are provisionally rejecting the idea that forgotten experiences
don't count.
Depending on how much bad the memory and anticipation of suffering is vs
the suffering itself, some people would prefer the first or second choice.
For someone for whom the actual experience is far worse than the memory
and anticipation, the 10 would be the preferred choice. Their average
happiness is higher with 10 than with 55, because the 55 seconds of
suffering counts very much against that choice.
Even someone like this, who if they could commit in advance would choose
the 10, might find themselves eventually choosing 55 in the experiment.
Before the experiment, they identified with all future instances of
themself. Even those whose experiences would be forgotten still counted,
their suffering was still going to be real. And so they acted to minimize
their future suffering. But once in the situation, faced each minute with
the awful memories of before, they lose their nerve. Even though they
know intellectually that it increases their suffering, the choice of 55
frees them from having to deal with the memory of pain.
Therefore I think there are many people who would choose 10 if they could
commit in advance, and 55 if they have to decide during the experiment.
This raises the question of whether they are being irrational in one or
the other choice. I'm not sure of the answer.
Perhaps a similar situation is faced by the heroin addict. If he injects
himself, he experiences a tremendous rush of pleasure. This is somewhat
analogous to the feeling of relief experienced by the choice of 55,
as the second hand seems to jump instantaneously from 0 to 55, with no
memory of the suffering. It's an easy choice with immediate rewards.
But the heroin addict's rewarding choice leads to terrible suffering
later. Each time he uses the drug, his addiction deepens, and he
eventually goes through the agony of withdrawal. He knew intellectually
that this would happen when he made his choice to inject the drug. If he
could commit in advance, he would choose not to use. But faced with the
temptation in the moment of truth, he makes the opposite decision and
injects himself. He accepts the short term pleasure even at a terrible
long term cost.
The subject in Lee's experiment doesn't face quite the same decision,
as the cost and reward are not separated in terms of time as with the
addict. But they are still present: a horrific cost, 55 seconds of a
suffering which is so bad that even 10 seconds is awful. And so he
chooses the rewarding outcome, which is to forget the suffering and
subjectively to skip over it.
By choosing the reward, he imposes the cost on himself. If he could do
so in advance, he would prevent himself from making this choice. Both
of these elements are present in Lee's example and also in the heroin
addict's dilemma. So my feeling is that the question of the rational
choice is similar in the two cases.
Hal
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