From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Tue Nov 12 2002 - 21:02:20 MST
gts writes
> Lee Corbin wrote:
>
> > As for me, I can only put my identity on a continuum and
> > say that I'm not the same person that I was at age 8, but
> > am mostly the same person I was at age 25, and definitely
> > the same person I was ten years ago.
>
> If you are, say, 40, then your statement amounts to the following:
>
> "As for me, I can only say that this age number of which I am thinking
> exists on a continuum and that it is not #8. This age number of which I
> am thinking is a number greater than #12.5 (it's mostly the same as
> #25), and it is definitely #30 (it's the same person I was 10 years
> ago). Therefore I am thinking of #30 and every other number greater than
> or less than #30 is not the age number I am thinking of."
In your second sentence, you imagine me as thinking of an "age
number" that has some property. What property?
Just in case I anticipate your answer, recall that some properties
(e.g. tallness) occur as a matter of degree. Hence I may say that
George Washington was tall, yet concede that if historical research
began to revise his height downward, my statement would become
progressively less true over time, as his true height was determined
to less and less.
> Numbers in a succession change from one to the next just as the
> identities of people change from one to the next. But so what, Lee?
Every real number is distinct from every other, yes, that's
true. But if "being the same person" is a matter of degree,
like several of us here claim, then what would be your
objection? (Do note the second word of the preceding
sentence.)
Lee
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