From: Rafal Smigrodzki (rms2g@virginia.edu)
Date: Tue Nov 05 2002 - 16:09:09 MST
John Clark wrote:
> "Rafal Smigrodzki" <rms2g@virginia.edu> Wrote:
>
>> if you think the back up is not you (maybe just before dying you
>> exclaim something to this effect), then of course the backup is not
>> you.
>
> It would be more accurate to say that if a backup thinks he is you
> then he is you. Some think it won't work but that doesn't matter, the
> process works even if you don't believe in it because the backup
> always remembers being you and thus the backup is convinced that he
> is you, and he's quite correct too.
>
### Well, this might get us into difficulties. Let's say somebody obtained
gts's personality scan data, made two subtly altered backups, gts-copies
with the subjective feeling of identity with the original gts. Gts would not
share this feeling. Could the two copies out-vote him?
I think that to have legal unity of identity you would need to have
bilateral (or maybe I should say, pseudo-unilateral) agreement between the
copies as to the sharing of their personal identity. In case of a frozen
backup with no running time the vote of the running backups should trump the
opinions inherent in the frozen brain (a bow to Eugen here). This would
hopefully minimize unnecessary conflict while allowing the practical use of
backups and multiple simultaneously active bodies and minds.
Rafal
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