From: gts (gts_2000@yahoo.com)
Date: Sun Nov 03 2002 - 08:53:04 MST
Lee Corbin wrote:
> We were talking about your "sense of self". If it's just a
> physical configuration, or processing, then it might indeed
> be the same regardless of whether it's you or your duplicate.
The term "sense of self" as I use it is closely related to the idea of
"self-concept." (I use the term "sense of self" only because it seems a more
pertinent term for discussions of surviving death. See below.) Self-concept
is far more than a map of memories. It is a sense of who one is as a
distinct person in relation to other people and objects in the world. It
changes dynamically, day by day if not also minute by minute and second by
second, in response to our interpretations of every day events. The
interpretation of one's memories (not only memories themselves) play some
part in defining one's self-concept, but the interpretation of memories
changes with time and events along with all other aspects of personality. I
may remember some things I did in the past that were completely congruent
with my self-concept at the time. Those same memories of past deeds no
longer seem congruent with my current self-concept -- my interpretation of
those memories has changed. The same can be said of more recent memories.
The further back in time I go, the more apparent are the incongruities, but
recent memories are also reinterpreted differently even if those different
interpretations are sometimes too small to notice short of an objective
personality test.
The idea that we are the same selves we were in the past is entirely
unworkable for any non-mundane purpose, and plainly false. This is not only
my idea, Lee. If you were to study psychology (as I have -- it was my minor
in college) then you would find this idea of dynamic personality in every
modern school of thought. The idea that we are fixed personalities is
archaic and outmoded. It appears to be a leftover from western religions,
which in general deny or ignore the importance of all personality changes
*except* religious conversion. In Christianity, for example, the self is
thought to remain the same for all practical purposes until one accepts
Christ as savior, at which time one is "born again." Fortunately modern
philosophers and psychologists have seen past this simplistic static
understanding of personality.You should do the same.
One's self-concept has no need of survival because self-concept already
changes moment to moment. In the context of these discussions about
surviving death, all we really seek as humans is a preservation of the sense
of continuity between our successive self-concepts. Please dwell on that
thought for a moment, and consider how it applies to the questions we are
asking here.
In this discussion I have been using the term "sense of self" to describe
this "sense of continuity between successive self-concepts."
>Of course, one's mood changes from moment to moment,
> and while I'd say that I'm not defined by my moods, you probably
> would say that if a backup was in a different mood than you had
> been at the moment of tragedy, then that's even more reason not
> to consider him the same person.
If the mood change were associated with a slight change in self-concept, as
mood changes generally are, then yes I would consider him a different
person, *by his own definition*.
-gts
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