From: Jef Allbright (jef@jefallbright.net)
Date: Fri Nov 01 2002 - 14:05:28 MST
gts wrote:
> Jef,
>
> Referees and gentle peacekeepers like you have a place in the world,
Thanks, I think. :-)
> and I admire and value your good intentions here in those respects,
> but I'd nevertheless very much like to see you take a firm position
> in this debate!
Actually, I thought I said very clearly that I generally agree with Lee's
reasoning on this up to his "level 6", but beyond that point, I think it is
more useful to consider multiple copies more like special twin siblings than
as effectively the same person.
>
> I don't accept your assessment that Lee and I are "talking about two
> different things." I think I understand perfectly what he is trying
> to say.
Well, from the variety of you've presented, it certainly seems clear to me
that you were (at least a little earlier) arguing a completely different
point than what was presented.
>
> Allow me to ask you the same question I asked Lee in a previous
> message, one that is so far unanswered by him. Perhaps this will
> bring you down off the fence.
>
> In your opinion, is the following statement true or false?
>
> "Two people who think differently about the same subject at the same
> time must be two different people."
Your phrasing makes it a bit difficult to respond: "Two people ... (some
qualifiers) ... must be two different people." Looks like a tautology to
me.
I thought I would proceed to answer your question anyway, assuming what I
think you meant, but next ran into the phrase "same subject" and quickly
realized that just as you argue that no two entities can be the same person,
you could argue that there is no case where [any particular subject to think
about] is exactly the same for two entities. So, the argument would
dissolve again.
So let me rephrase what I think you're asking, and then answer it.
Sorry, I tried and didn't find a way to logically express what you were
asking in that sentence. (I'm not being facetious here.) It was either
circular or meaningless in any form I could think of.
>
> If you accept my statement above as true then here is the follow-up:
Sorry, I can't, but let's try to go ahead anyway.
> "It is contrary to reason to say that two different people have the
> same identity." (Where "identity" is understood to be non-nominal
> identity, i.e., personality/self)
I suppose a simple response to this is the following:
I. A person's thoughts, moods, opinions, memories, change somewhat from day
to day, week to week, and so on.
II. Despite all this change happening to a person over time, we think of
him/her as the same person.
III. The difference between an original and duplicate at any time can be
less than the normal variation of an individual over time.
Therefore, it can be reasonably said that an original and duplicate are the
same person.
Furthermore, aquaintances of the person could meet either the original or
the duplicate, and would assure you that this is the same person they know.
You could ask the original or the duplicate, and they would each assure you
they are the same person.
You could give either the original or the duplicate any test of identity
that we currently consider valid in our society, and either would pass the
test as the same person.
So, in a very practical sense, both the original and the duplicate can have
the same personal identity.
Now, are they "identical persons"? Clearly they are not. They have many
differences between them that will continue to increase with time. But no
one is saying they are identical, the point is only that it can be
reasonably said that they have the same personal identity as described
above. (If this feels wrong, please go back to "step I" again and just run
through it again openly and without bias.)
If you find that you simply can't accept two living human organisms, for all
practical measurable purposes, having the same personal identity, then ask
yourself why. It's not bad logic. It's just completely unfamiliar, and we
have the serious problem of the word "identity" getting in the way of the
concept.
identity (noun)
1. The distinct personality of an individual regarded as a persisting entity
2. Collective aspect of the set of characteristics by which a thing is
recognizable or known
3. An operator that leaves unchanged the element on which it operates
4. Exact sameness
Meaning #2 is exactly what we mean, but #1 and #4 contradict our meaning and
cause confusion.
- Jef
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