From: Robert J. Bradbury (bradbury@aeiveos.com)
Date: Tue Oct 29 2002 - 15:22:24 MST
On Tue, 29 Oct 2002, Dickey, Michael F wrote:
> The latter would require, as far as I can tell, someone to argue that
> logically a copy is indeed a continuation of the subjective consciousness of
> the original. Given the fact that a copy and me will see different things,
> and that we both can exist simultaneously, and are spatially separated, it
> seems unlikely.
Can we get someplace by considering the concept of cellular division?
Many bacteria and cells divide. When that happens each gets half of
original DNA, proteins, lipids, cytoplasm, etc.
So we put Damien under general anesthesia, disassemble him atom by atom,
then reassemble 2 copies, each of which has half of the original Damien's
atoms. So they are both "copies" but would seem to equally have Damien's
"identity". When they both come out of it, how could they *not* view
themselves subjectively as the continuation of the original? (Note
how I've probably doubled the number of good books for us to read
by using this strategy. ... takes brief bow ... )
Robert
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