From: Lee Daniel Crocker (lee@piclab.com)
Date: Tue Oct 29 2002 - 13:41:00 MST
I never get involved in these silly debates about "identity"
and duplication, because I have yet to see anyone ask a
question that's meaningful and interesting instead of just
prattling on about definitions. But an almost unnoticed
side comment in this latest one brought to mind an issue I
do think is interesting and worth exploring: the nature of
"obligation" and "communal planning".
I will simply assume--because I think there can be no
reasonable objection--that at some point in our technology
I will be able to duplicate everything I find interesting
about the 110-kg lump of matter I presently occupy in some
other 110-kg lump of matter, or even in some other substrate
(how "exact" is irrelevant, since surely everything that's
interesting and meaningful and unique about me is a tiny
fraction of the total information content of this particular
lump). I will further assume that this second instance of
class Me will behave just as we would expect any other
sentient lump of matter to behave, and that he will be
granted rights and autonomy as any other sentient, and that
I, having created him, will grant him the assets necessary
to start a productive life.
The interesting question, then, is how do we, the other
sentients, handle cases where we have contracted with the
not-yet-duplicated me for some future plans? The case of
a destructive scan-and-dup should be pretty simple: it's
close enough to existing notions of "transportation" that
we can just treat it that way. But what about the case
where I deliberately fork, and my dup goes off travelling
while I remain for a while, and then, say, die in an
accident because I knowingly took an excessive risk? Do
the people to whom I owed obligations have a greater claim
than the ordinary one on my estate, or a claim against my
other fork, because there's another instance out there who
remembers giving the obligation, might be in a position to
fulfill it (for example, because he clearly has the skills
and experience I did), and because my knowledge of that
other instance made me more inclined to take that risk?
How do my obligations, alliances, and contracts with others
affect my ability to fork? If I am married, do I have the
right to create a fork or give it any of my assets if that
wasn't anticipated in the marriage contract? Is the fork
bound by any obligations of care I (and therefore he) gave
to my spouse should the original instance die? Is it
acceptable for me to fulfill a contract for my services
by sub-contracting my twin? Can I choose to apportion not
only my assets, but my personal obligations between the two
as we see fit (for example, could I let one of me own my
medical insurance and another me own my life insurance,
and a third me keep my marriage?
Can I form contracts between me and my twin before his
creation? After all, I know everything he will know when
he is created, and have all the same motivations, so
shouldn't I be able to sign on his future behalf?
If I destructively scan and duplicate myself in another
substrate (say an upload, or a bush robot), am I obligated
to choose a form that can physically accomplish whatever
obligations I may have had in my present form? Can I still
hold others to obligations they may have had to my previous
form, since I remember and still desire them, even though
they did not anticipate my transformation?
-- Lee Daniel Crocker <lee@piclab.com> <http://www.piclab.com/lee/> "All inventions or works of authorship original to me, herein and past, are placed irrevocably in the public domain, and may be used or modified for any purpose, without permission, attribution, or notification."--LDC
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