From: Eugen Leitl (eugen@leitl.org)
Date: Tue Oct 29 2002 - 10:21:29 MST
On Tue, 29 Oct 2002, gts wrote:
> Yes, and people who are not identical certainly cannot have the same
> identity. I wonder why some people find this so hard to swallow.
I am an upload, and maintain an incremental backup which is up to date
within biological chronon (currently some 10 ms). I step up to a nuke in
person, and detonate it. My hardware is destroyed within ms, and the
remote backup is being instantly instantiated. What I see subjectively is
that I'm teleported to a new location. No bifurcation had time to occur.
I'm happy that I have kept a backup.
I am an upload, and maintain an incremental backup which is up to date
within biological chronon. Somebody tortures me for an hour, and then
kills me. The remote backup is being instantiated. I see subjectively is
that I'm teleported to a new location, after a harrowing experience.
I am an upload, and maintain an incremental backup which is up to date
within biological chronon. Somebody severes the link to the archive,
tortures me for an hour, and then kills me. The remote backup is being
instantiated as soon as the link is severed (or after an hour, or two
megayears). While I'm screaming and bleeding virtual blood all the way to
/dev/null the new instance of me perceives to be teleported after the link
has been severed (whew! it heaves a virtual sigh). The new instance of me
which has forked of (and thus is no longer me) has no idea what is
happening to me. All it knows is that it got reactivated at some point
when the link broke down. While I certainly wish I was in its place this
doesn't currently help me with the current predilection.
Would I be erased within few ms after the link has broken down there would
be no bifurcation. One could even automate that, except it would
inconvinient to croak at the slightest connectivity outage. People could
DoS you that way.
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