From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Fri Oct 25 2002 - 23:23:16 MDT
Jef writes
> As I see it, and I really don't like speaking for others, but I'll try here
> with the hope of cutting it short, is that Lee is asking you to consider
> broadening your definition of self to see that the other person, for most
> practical purposes, can be effectively considered to have the same
> self-identity as you.
Thanks, I was too busy to participate. Yes, you are right
about my alternate view to gts's.
> Once you accept that the copy can be considered to be effectively you,
> recognized by your friends as you, and for most practical purposes, is the
> same as you, with the exception of some different memories, then you can
> logically say that "you" (as your identity can be defined) can exist in two
> places at once. It's not implying some new interpretation of physics. It's
> just a different understanding or definition of self identity.
>
> In many ways this can be a useful way of looking at things, but personally,
> I think this broadening of the definition of self obscures important
> details. I think I understand Lee's key point, but it seems to me that it
> would be more accurate and useful to refer to "that branch of me" over
> there, than to IMO oversimplify it by saying that it's precisely me.
Indeed, in many imaginary scenarios involving you and your
duplicate it becomes necessary to distinguish them. Just
imagine what it would be like; when I have, they continue
to speak using the words "I" and "me".
"After you, Stanley." "No. After you, Ollie" ;-)
When the two duplicates discuss the peculiar state of their
identity, remarks are made by them (say their name is Ken
Smith) that go like this:
"Ken (this)" [pinches cheek] "sees the clock on the wall.
"Ken (over here) [pinches cheek] does *not* see the clock
on the wall."
"Whether Ken sees the clock depends on which version
of Ken someone is referring to!", they both agree.
I say that they are only the same person with respect to
the issue of personal identity, which is to say personal
*survival*. If one of the two Ken's must die, then it's
not a big deal to them because each understands that he
really doesn't die. The physical form that remains after
one dies is *exactly* like the other if the other
(a) lost a very few memories
(b) was teleported a few feet
(c) gained a few memories
Since none of these operations threaten (or *should*
threaten) one's personal identity, for one of the Ken's
to die does not threaten his existence. It is merely
a tremendously *lamentable* waste of resources and
diminution of run time.
I mean this literally for him. Suppose he is a Most
Selfish Individual and he and his duplicate can even
watch with glee other people being tortured because
they only care about themselves. Even if he is such
an MSI and really cares *only* about his own survival
and about his own pleasures and pains:
1. He should regard pain inflicted on his duplicate
as pain inflicted on him to the greatest degree
that he is intellectually capable. "I (over here)
may not be feeling the pain, but that *doesn't*
mean it isn't happening to me!"
2. He should regard memory acquisition as a local
process in some ways and a global process in
other ways. "Just because I, Ken, am not
accumulating additional memories at this end
of the room *does not* mean that I am not
collecting them somewhere else in this room."
Always before in human history, memory accumulation
has been synonymous with experience. This need not be
the case in the future, (but continuing this chain of
thought digresses into other thought-experiments).
3. He *needs* to regard the survival of his duplicate
as survival of himself because the aforementioned
three operations a, b, and c pose no real threat
to him.
Although one's common sense strenuously objects to the
idea of being in two places at the same time, the more
we learn of the nature of time, the less problematical
this will become. I heartily endorse Julian Balbour's
book "The End of Time" which is, I think, the most
difficult but the most rewarding physics book that
I have ever read that does not contain a single
equation.
Lee
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