From: Dickey, Michael F (michael_f_dickey@groton.pfizer.com)
Date: Fri Oct 25 2002 - 11:58:50 MDT
-----Original Message-----
From: gts [mailto:gts@optexinc.com]
Michael F Dickey wrote:
We seem to agree on most every point in this discussion, and your
agreement is refreshing and very welcome, but here is an area in which I
think we differ:
> This is the core of my argument. If you copy and original,
> the original and the copy do not share the same sensory experience,
> so they *must not* be the same person (that is,
> *one* entity) They may be the same as in they are both
> identical to one another (as the change in time approaches zero)
> but they are two distinct separate entities. Similarly, if you
> copy an original and destroy the original, there is no reason
> to suspect that this new copy is a continuation
> of the subjective experience of the original. To presume as
> much would imply that the original and the copy are telepathically
> linked in some way, this is quite unscientific.
"I agree wholeheartedly that copies made in different locations are
suspect due to different sensory experience. However imagine a situation
in which we instantaneously destroy and replace your original person
with an exact copy in the exact same position, but made from entirely
different atoms. If I understand you correctly, you are arguing that the
use of different atoms would mean that you would die and that your copy
would not be you. If so then I disagree."
AND
"This observation above is what leads to me ponder the possibility of
instantaneous destructive teleportation. If what I say in the above
paragraph is true then instant destructive teleportation might also work
if the original quantum states (with adjustments for position) could be
duplicated instantaneously by an assemblage of particles at the
destination location."
That would indeed be the implications of my argument. In its simplest form,
that fact that the copy appears in the same place as the original in the
same state removes the only differentiating factor available before, that of
position. This falls inline with the same argument of whether or not we are
continually destroyed and recreated as we move through time. As I
understand it, there is no interval of time shorter than the plank length,
thus any sub atomic particles that exist through time do not have a smooth
continuous existence, but instead of many brief existences that are tied
only by their average similarity in space and time. (the same could be said
of moving through space) The implications of this can destroy my theory or
support it, here are the two scenarios I can think of.
As all matter travels through time, it exists in many short finite intervals
of time, not as a continuous smooth timeline.
(bare with me here as my wording my not be up to par with current lingo)
1) does all matter share the same intervals, that is, if we re to view the
existence through time of subatomic particles through some hypothetical
unaffected observer, would particles be in synch with one another in the
process of being destroyed and recreated at every planck length interval of
time? OR..
2) does each sub atomic particle have its own unique timing through the
quanta of time. That is, if we were observing multiple sub atomic
particles, would all of their destructions and recreations occur at
different times when compared with one another?
As I noted above, I believe the same concern exists when moving through
space, as space does not exist in any smaller intervals than the Planck
length, and the same two scenarios would apply when moving through space.
I have no idea which of these is the accurate description of reality, or if
we even know (or can know) or even if I explained it clear enough to make
any sense to anyone else!
But assuming that one of these is an accurate description of reality, then
the implications are significantly different in regards to copying. In case
one, essentially, the entire universe pops into and out of existence at
every Planck length interval of time at the same time. This necessarily
means that any being in it, composed of a pattern of matter, also pops into
and out of existence at this small interval of time. If this is the case,
then it matters not if I were destroyed and teleported somewhere else
instantly, because the only difference between that and what happens all the
time is the position, which I do not feel it is reasonable to presume has
any bearing on continual subjective consciousness. This requires,
obviously, that the scanning / copying / teleporting process takes place at
the plank length of time, in any interval longer the situation changes as
the two scenarios are no longer identical. If this is the way the universe
works, then I agree with you in your objection.
Assuming that case 2 is the accurate description of reality, then this
satisfies one of my previously mentioned requirements, that at any one
instant in time the vast majority of the stuff that makes up your pattern is
the same that it was an instant of time before. If that were the case then
destructive scanning copying transporting would violate that, and make none
of the things that made up my pattern part of the things that made up my
pattern the instant before. In this case I would not agree with your
objection, and would not consider myself the same person if all of my
particles were instantly destroyed and recreated by others at the very next
instant in time.
I have the sneeking suspicion that case 2 is the more accurate description
of reality, but that may be mere wishfull thinking.
Regards,
Michael
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