From: gts (gts@optexinc.com)
Date: Fri Oct 25 2002 - 10:43:18 MDT
Michael F Dickey wrote:
We seem to agree on most every point in this discussion, and your
agreement is refreshing and very welcome, but here is an area in which I
think we differ:
> This is the core of my argument. If you copy and original,
> the original and the copy do not share the same sensory experience,
> so they *must not* be the same person (that is,
> *one* entity) They may be the same as in they are both
> identical to one another (as the change in time approaches zero)
> but they are two distinct separate entities. Similarly, if you
> copy an original and destroy the original, there is no reason
> to suspect that this new copy is a continuation
> of the subjective experience of the original. To presume as
> much would imply that the original and the copy are telepathically
> linked in some way, this is quite unscientific.
I agree wholeheartedly that copies made in different locations are
suspect due to different sensory experience. However imagine a situation
in which we instantaneously destroy and replace your original person
with an exact copy in the exact same position, but made from entirely
different atoms. If I understand you correctly, you are arguing that the
use of different atoms would mean that you would die and that your copy
would not be you. If so then I disagree.
In the special case I describe above I think you would continue as the
same person with same sense of self. In fact you would have no way to
know that anything had actually occurred. The only requirement for this
continuity of self would be that the replacement process take place in
the blink of an eye -- in a time interval shorter than the quantum
interval of time -- such that the duplicated atoms and particles would
appear in exactly the same states as your original atoms and particles.
This observation above is what leads to me ponder the possibility of
instantaneous destructive teleportation. If what I say in the above
paragraph is true then instant destructive teleportation might also work
if the original quantum states (with adjustments for position) could be
duplicated instantaneously by an assemblage of particles at the
destination location.
In the case of instantaneous non-destructive teleportation, in which
your original survives, the two versions of you would diverge in the
first moment such that two distinct people would exist. Those two
distinct people would be like identical twins who share some memories in
common. They would be intimately related, but neither would consider
himself to be the other.
-gts
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