From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Wed Oct 23 2002 - 18:15:28 MDT
Michael Dickey writes
> Ahh, it has been a couple months since we had this discussion. I still find
> it difficult to understand how people can assert that a copy of you is you.
> gts may at the same time consider himself the same person as he was a few
> minutes ago while considering himself a different person than a copy made a
> few minutes ago and still be logically consistent. You said "And if you
> agree to that, then you can see why logically I can consider myself to be
> the same person as a close duplicate" But gts is made up of the same atoms,
> molecules, and neurons in the same pattern performing the same functions as
> gts t-10s was. However, a duplicate of gts is made up of entirely different
> atoms, molecules, and neurons, even though they are in the same pattern.
What one must first do, however, is dispense with the idea
that the *particular* atoms have anything to do with one's
identity. Namely, if during the next nanosecond it were
somehow possible to remove atom1 from your body and replace
it with an identical atom---and QM assures us that all atoms
of a given element excluding different isotopes are equivalent
---then I don't think that you would notice the difference.
If one does agree with me, then, that the *particular* atoms
have nothing to do with your personal identity, then the
objection you make in your last paragraph falls to the ground.
> Imagine this thought experiment. You walk into a room, a non-destructive
> scanner copies you and creates a duplicate, now you and your duplicate are
> isolated. Can you see, feel, hear, taste anything that your duplicate can?
No, I certainly can not! But then here it is assumed that
you are addressing *one* of the two, and that is what that
*one* will say.
> If you think you cannot [right, I cannot], then you are
> two separate persons in separate places, albeit persons
> that are identical.
So say you. I contend that we are actually the same
*person*, though clearly what is to be contended is
what is meant by that construction. (This is, of
course, the entire basis of the discussion.)
> I consider there to be three parts to a person
>
> 1) the pattern of his molecules / atoms
>
> If we took our brain and put it into a blender, we still have the same
> atoms, but no person, so the pattern is important
>
> 2) the molecules / atoms that make up his pattern
>
> If we took different molecules / atoms and put them into the same pattern
> (copying) then the person behaves identical to the original, but can not
> sense, feel, what the original feels when sensory isolated. Therefore they
> are different persons, and the atoms that we are made up of are important.
> Destroying the original does not change this.
>
> 3) the rate of change of those molecules / atoms in that part are orders of
> magnitude smaller than the total atoms / molecules that make up the pattern,
> so at any given time the vast majority of the molecules and atoms that make
> up your pattern are the same as the ones at the instant before.
>
> If none of our atoms are replaced, we remain the same person (same pattern,
> same atoms) if all are replaced, we are a different person (same pattern,
> different atoms, different subjective experience).
What evidence would you ever have that this is the case?
Is there any way that you can know that this is not being
done to you each millisecond in an operation that requires
only one nanosecond? If you talked to someone who was,
in your terms, a thousand different people each second
you'd still have a very normal conversation with him.
It begins to devolve into unstable concepts to imagine
that you, or he, are a thousand different people during
an ordinary second.
> Our brains are in a constant state of change, we are not made up of the same
> atoms today that we were made up of 1 year ago, yet we still consider
> ourselves to be the same person as we were a year ago (albeit with some new
> bits). Does this mean that we are justified in saying that a copy is me,
> because just as the atoms in our brains change over time to eventually all
> be replaced, a copy merely replaces all of those atoms at once? I think
> logically the significant difference is that in one case all of the atoms
> are replaced, thus none of the molecules and atoms that make up your pattern
> were the same ones that made up your pattern the instant before. It is
> clear from case 2) that the molecules are important to the subjective you,
> to your continual perception of consciousness, because in a different group
> of molecules with the same atoms separated sensory experiences occur.
> Replacing All of your atoms in your pattern is a far different effect than
> replacing less than all, or less than 1 millionth of them. As in ANY case
> other then replacing them all, that vast majority of atoms that make up your
> pattern are the same ones that were making up your pattern the instant
> before.
But I still think that you are incorrect for the reasons I gave above.
> I, for one, will not ever walk into a destructive copying or uploading
> mechanism, as this will surely lead to my demise.
Yet as I have said many times before, you would soon
be in the small minority as more practical people
used teleportation to get about quickly and cheaply.
Finally, you'd be seen to be an old fogey from the
last century who had some strange hang-up about atoms.
Lee
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