From: Dan Fabulich (dfabulich@warpmail.net)
Date: Tue Sep 03 2002 - 19:09:07 MDT
gts wrote:
> So then immortality is available only to those who have good luck? :-)
I realize that you were being glib here, but this is, in fact, obviously
true, presuming that anyone will ever be immortal.
> This discussion goes to the philosophy of probability, which is itself a
> fascinating subject and one that I have considered in the past. You have
> invoked what is known as the "frequentist" interpretation of
> probability. It's logically consistent, but frequentism is only one of
> at least two valid interpretations of probability.
<ahem> I selected a frequentist example just to make the distinction
clearer. But we can wage this argument in Bayesian terms as well, if you
like.
> A person with a 1/32768 chance of dying is not "exempt from death."
You might be saying one of two things here. One of them is a mistake, and
one of them is creative, but rather implausible.
If you concede that there is a *fact* of the matter as to whether you are
exempt from death or are not exempt from death, then the Bayesian
probability of your immortality is merely a measure of your subjective
confidence in your beliefs about the fact. So having a 1/32768 chance
(subjective confidence) of death just means that you have a 32767/32768
chance of being *really* exempt from death.
The fact that you don't know which, in this case, doesn't matter, because
there's a deeper fact that holds regardless of your subjective confidence.
You could *really* be immortal, *really* be exempt from death, without
being sure of it.
If you *don't* concede that there's a fact of the matter as to whether you
are immortal or not, then I must concede that you could construct your
terms in such a way that immortality (like absolute certainty) is
unavailable.
For example, you might be the sort of Bayesian who thinks that subjective
confidence is all there is; that there is no deeper probability/fact to
know about. In that case, then you might think that immortality means
100% subjective confidence in your eternal lifespan, which is obviously
unattainable.
But I see no reason to think that "immortality" is a special case on this
interpretation; ALL "a posteriori" predicates would suffer from the same
problems of uncertainty under this reading. After all, doesn't the
property of being "red" imply that there's no chance of not being red?
Doesn't it follow from the fact that I'm twenty-three years old that there
is no chance that I am younger than this? But how could I call myself
"twenty-three" if there's a chance that I'm not twenty-three?
If you don't automatically concede to arguments of this kind in the case
of mundane a posteriori predicates like "is red" and "is twenty-three
years old", then I should hardly see why you'd let them go through in the
case of "is immortal." So if the ultra-slim chance that I'm not
twenty-three doesn't block me from correctly saying "I'm twenty-three",
then the ultra-slim chance that I'm not immortal shouldn't block me from
concluding "I'm immortal."
Maybe you think the term "immortal" is special because it's about the
future? But what does that have to do with anything?
Or what about the logical negation of immortality? Why does the fact that
there's a probability involved make it incorrect to say that you're
immortal without making it incorrect to say that you're mortal?
-Dan
-unless you love someone-
-nothing else makes any sense-
e.e. cummings
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