From: Dan Fabulich (dfabulich@warpmail.net)
Date: Tue Sep 03 2002 - 03:34:59 MDT
Lee Corbin wrote:
> Well, I don't think so: we should indeed keep using the
> word "truth" when we are talking *ABOUT* our theories, of
> course keeping in mind that absolute certainty is impossible.
As you may imagine, I don't see the issue as quite so cut-and-dry as this.
> > > If so, then you [Charles] have captured an interesting perspective;
> > > a language which teaches us something about ourselves. Do you
> > > think we should have that language instead of our current language?
> > > What do you think we'd have to gain? What do you think we'd lose
> > > in terms of scientific passion if scientists never pursued The
> > > Truth but only pursued utility?
>
> As you are perhaps hinting, I also think that we would
> lose a lot. In fact, Godel claims to have succeeded
> *because* he believed that "the truth was out there",
> and that mathematics is not just a human invention.
> I would suppose that any number of scientists were
> ---however they expressed it---really after the truth
> about something when they got their big breakthrough.
Certainly, abandoning the natural realistic language we've been using for
so long would be difficult at best, and dangerous at worst. But realizing
that we shouldn't abandon this language is a world of difference from
saying that we shouldn't check out the others.
Maybe realism is your favorite language for science (though it's still a
difficult fit in QM), but non-realism teaches you the most about how to
look at morality, or at mathematics.
I think either way the key lesson that we learn is that we don't have to
*insist* on realism; we can look abroad and see what works. When all we
have to lose is the table-thumping rhetoric of "P is *really* true!" we're
especially well licensed to look elsewhere.
> Charles writes
>
> > Perhaps. But that may also just be a short-cut for when we don't want to
> > think carefully about things. Truth, by indicating a absolute certainty,
> > stops thought, and with limited abilities to process, that can be important.
> > I just don't believe that it's ever literally true. (Is that a paradox?)
>
> "Truth" should *never* indicate an absolute certainty. Even in
> those cases where it does, e.g., "yea, listen up, heah is de
> Lord's Sacred Truth...", one evaluates just who is claiming what.
One OUGHT to, but the structure of our language, especially "Lord's Sacred
Truth" language, encourages us *not* to do this. Eliminating the truth
words (as awkward as that might be) might help us get out of that rut;
certainly Charles' point holds that truth words hardly ever crop up in
technical literature. I agree with Charles that this is customary for a
good and useful reason.
> Naturally your paradox isn't a paradox. We have to use *some*
> word like true, I'm afraid. You may find a circumlocution that
> appears not to use it, "it is the case that" being one favorite,
> but it came into our language (and perhaps everyone's?) for a
> reason.
I disagree. We could remove them without significant loss of content,
especially from technical articles, which may simply make statements in
the indicative mood without emphasizing their claims as "true". As a
trivial example, you could just swap them for "ought" words ("I wonder
whether I ought to believe X").
You may be surprised just how much you can strip out of the English
language and still get something useful/interesting. Take this example
from our Extropian glossary.
http://www.generalsemantics.org/Articles/E-Prime_intro.htm
E-Prime would obviously ban statements like "X is true".
> But what's the downside of the reification of Truth? Pretty
> paltry, if you ask me. Yes, among the barely literate it
> results in extra verbiage (and occasionally for me too).
> Also, it makes it mandatory that we spread the meme "all
> knowledge is conjectural" or "absolute truth is unattainable".
> But we probably should spread those memes anyway.
These memes are important, but think how much easier it'd be if the
grammar of our language included conjugation of degrees of certainty,
where it'd be impossible to merely say that X is true; you could only
gauge the certainty with which you believe it.
And anyway, let's not forget that the realists have some rather
significant atrocities to account for, atrocities which, on their face,
seem as if they couldn't have happened if everyone was a postmodernist.
Take religious/ideological wars, for example.
(Now, if your theory of history suggests that putatively ideological wars
are not really ideological, you may not find this example so convincing.
But, in that case, I'm pretty sure you're already convinced.)
> But the downside of throwing away "the Truth" is considerable!
> It foments double-think in some academics (thankfully none
> on this list) who talk one way about scientific things and
> another---very astutely---about, say, the credentials of a
> bitterly resented colleague.
I am officially in doubt that the ability to think in many ways will
significantly reduce your ability to think in your own way, or to see what
way is dictated by your own culture.
Talking nasty behind other people's backs is a no-no in our culture and
most others, with good reason. Sure, you could consider the question from
another point of view from which it may be acceptable (or, I suppose,
required/admirable), but I think we still know better than to do so.
> (Here is an example of the first way of speaking by Bruno
> Latour, notorious arch-post-modernist, while discussing the
> to him ridiculous contention of French scientists in 1976
> that Ramses II died of tuberculosis, "How could Ramses II
> die in 1213 B.C. from a bacillus discovered by Robert Koch
> in 1882?". Post-modernism really can mess up some people's
> thinking. For other hilarious examples, see "Fashionable
> Nonsense" by Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont.)
Yeah, well. It's a point of view. It's part of his job to find
interesting points of view.
> The other obvious downside is that abandoning "the Truth"
> encourages solipsism, and probably other evil 20th century
> "isms", like positivism.
I'm going to go on the line here and say that solipsism isn't a real
problem for our modern culture. Egotism, sure, but solipsism? I don't
see it. Solipsism, real live solipsism, is a psychological pathology; I'm
pretty sure it doesn't correlate with academic trends.
-Dan
-unless you love someone-
-nothing else makes any sense-
e.e. cummings
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Sat Nov 02 2002 - 09:16:39 MST