From: Greg Burch (gregburch@gregburch.net)
Date: Sat Aug 17 2002 - 10:21:36 MDT
> From: Anders Sandberg
> Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2002 6:49 AM
> I have noted that the quality of foreign policy ideas posted
> here generally tends to be notably low; while there are some
> quite advanced threads on science, people in general here
> does not seem to be well versed in political science, law or
> history (the fields most relevant to saying anything useful
> about this kind of issue). That doesn't stop anyone from
> posting and having opinions. But opinion is worthless, it is
> just what we happen to think or feel, not good arguments
> based on facts and tied to how the world really works. A good
> discussion makes people bring up arguments for various
> positions, and then they are tested and refined. In the end
> we will have learned something useful from it. But a debate
> of opinions is just about showing the passion of views and
> does seldom lead to any clarity.
Of course, for those few of us from the other side of "the two
cultures", lack of knowledge doesn't stop us from posting opinions about
scientific and technical matters. I hope my opinions in those areas are
taken with the grain of salt they are due, though.
> Here is a suggestion to turn this thread into something
> useful: increase the abstraction level to cool things down.
> Instead of assuming the nuke to have been delivered by some
> specific Muslim countries (which anyway makes the issue far
> more trivial), assume it was delivered by a global
> ideological network of some kind. Let's ignore what their
> ideology is, the important factor is that these people exist
> in and are citizens of many countries (including the US) and
> they are not trivial to spot. What policies would be
> reasonable then? What goals would we seek to accomplish?
> (especially the last question is interesting. An obvious goal
> would be no more nuked cities, but would that imply no more
> nuked cities in the US or anywhere? At that point does
> precautions against threats become threats in themselves?)
This *IS* the abstracted generalization of the problem. Up to the very
recent past, only states had the power to do violence on large scales
and with sufficient force to have an impact on very large numbers of
people (the few instances of strategically important assassinations by
individuals or small groups being the rare exception). Two and half
millennia of strategic and tactical thinking is seriously called into
question by the advent of techno-terrorists (which, ironically, the 911
hijackers were). Coupled with the natural inertia of the strategic and
military intelligentsia, we're facing a truly unique challenge in human
history.
That traditional state-vs.-state military options are not as effective
in dealing with the threat of techno-terrorists as they are in the
milieu in which they developed seems obvious. They have their place:
Where terrorists seize the machinery of state and use it for their ends
-- as in Afghanistan -- employment of traditional military force (albeit
significantly augmented and enhanced by new technology) seems
appropriate and effective. But terrorist action cells dispersed
throughout the world, supported by a broader trans-national cultural and
ethnic base, is a kind of target that is largely skew to traditional
strategic and tactical values of counterforce, deterrence and reprisal.
On the suggestion of Damien Broderick, I'm currently reading "The Shield
of Achilles" by Philip Bobbitt. This book -- which is definitely a
"heavy read" -- attempts to put the current world strategic situation
into the context of the evolution of state, legal constitutional orders
(in the broadest sense) and military technology (also in the broadest
sense) over the last 500 years or so. The book was largely written
before 911, but the author added some material to the text after that
and noted that he felt his analysis held up well under the circumstances
of that event. I'm only about 25% of the way through the book at this
point, but I find much of value in it: The basic thesis that the three
factors upon which he focuses operate on each other in a non-linear,
"field" function (his term) seems very fruitful and robust in connection
both with Bobbitt's discussion of history and my own knowledge. I
mention this book because reading it has put me in mind of the general
subject of this thread and Anders' post in particular.
At this point, all I can say with any certainty is that the old equation
of state power with territorial limits and clearly-defined citizenship
is breaking down (much as many extropians predicted for many years that
it would be). The questions raised by the breakdown of this traditional
equivalence seem to be:
-- How do we define combatants?
-- What are the legitimate sources of authority -- both civil and
military -- for responding to terrorist action?
-- What tactics should the responders employ?
-- What are the legitimate ultimate strategic ends to which combat with
terrorist forces should be aimed?
My personal OPINION is that finding answers to these questions is made
exceedingly difficult by two things: Religion and the inertia of the
forces of the old territorial nation-state, still dominant in many, if
not most spheres of life. Because of these two factors, it is almost
impossible to think or speak clearly in the public domain about the
questions identified above. The identifying characteristics of the
"enemy" are their IDEAS and VALUES, but public figures cannot speak,
much less think clearly about these ideas and values because religion is
still the dominant ideological mode of all the world except western
Europe, the non-US anglic world, China and Japan. Political leaders
cannot condemn Islamic fundamentalism, because religious ideas are
considered beyond questioning in the public sphere. This is so to such
an extent that even political and military policy makers from the most
secular powers cannot address the basic ideological problems in public
discourse.
Beyond this, the "tool kit" available to policy makers is still largely
that of the age of territorial nation-states. National armies
contending for control of territory are still the basic available means
of dealing with large-scale violence. Attempts to form trans-national
military forces have begun, but flounder on the wide diversity of
detailed implementation of the dominant parliamentarian form of politics
and the inability of national political leaders from a wide diversity of
national polities to agree on strategic and tactical ends and means.
(For instance, if U.S. forces must fight in coalition with German
forces, no action is possible except against traditional state
territorial aggression and the most egregious state-sponsored violence
-- such as in the Balkans.)
A personal goal of mine is to try to come to some kind of concrete
conception of what might be done to break this impasse and find
realistic, workable answers to the key questions I've identified. I'm
not hopeful that this will happen quickly, but Fukuyama's belief that
history came to an end around 1990 to the contrary, I believe it has to
be done.
Greg Burch
Vice-President, Extropy Institute
http://www.gregburch.net
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