From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Sat Aug 17 2002 - 08:57:04 MDT
Carlos writes
> [Lee writes]
>> Personally, I'm more interested in this scenario: all
>> that is known is that the Al Qaeda organization intends to
>> destroy some American city on a certain date, and on that
>> date---despite the West's best efforts---Manhattan goes up.
>> What (from one's limited knowledge and experience) would
>> one recommend that the U.S. government do?
> I was just right now reading a very interesting article, in the last
> issue of Policy Review Online: Al Qaeda's Fantasy Ideology.
>
> http://www.policyreview.org/AUG02/harris_print.html
>
> [It says]
>
> "The fact that we are involved with an enemy who is not engaged in
> Clausewitzian warfare has serious repercussions on our policy. For we are
> fighting an enemy who has no strategic purpose in anything he does,
> whose actions have significance only in terms of his own fantasy
> ideology. [Normally] they would be compelled to [think] realistically,
> in terms of objective factors such as overall strategic goals, war
> aims, and so forth.
Yes. It seems to me that indeed they don't make realistic
assessments of what the likely outcomes are to be. (IMHO
they have utterly no chance of success, unless indeed the
80 or so Russian nukes are in their possession, and then
they'd have no *long-term* prospects of success anyway.
Their form of atavistic culture is hopeless.)
> ...it is almost as if the "real" world no longer matters
> in terms of the fantasy ideology of radical Islam. Our
> "real" world, after all, is [an] utterly secular...series
> of cause and effect, with all events occurring on a single
> ontological plane. But the "real" world of radical Islam
> is different - its fantasy ideology reflects...
To me, that is true, but resembles the way that otherwise
intelligent people lose their tempers and commit acts
ultimately harmful to themselves. (There are evolutionary
reasons why such acts are not quite so harmful as they
appear, and our anger and resentment are parts of long-term
genetic strategy.) But I submit that to devout Muslims
belonging to certain fundamental sects, it's a sense of
outrage at the West and a sense that the chosen course
of action is the only honorable one.
> This is why the mere fact that there is no "realistic" hope of
> al Qaeda destroying the United States - and indeed the West as
> a whole - is not of the slightest consequence. After all, if
> God is willing, the United States and the West could collapse
> at any moment.
Yes, that seems to explain things quite well.
Carlos himself adds
> (end quote)
>
> So to answer the question partially. I don't know for sure, but whatever
> the US government does should, if the view provided in that article is
> correct and important, take into account that the opponent is
> non-Clausewitzian in action and purpose. A retribution consisting in
> say, nuking a few major cities in the Arab world looks to me like a
> Clausewitzian answer, and hence I think an improper one in this
> situation. It would not stop Al Qaida, or discourage them in any
> significant way, while on the other side would cause Clausewitzian
> reactions on many other governments, not only local or only Arab.
Yes, under the hypothesis at the top of your post---namely
that the U.S. *doesn't* have any evidence that those nations
were involved, nuking cities seems ineffective to me, and,
as you say, possibly counter-productive. But using nuclear
weapons and anything else at the West's disposal against
Al Qaeda cells, even if in some metropolitan areas, might
be effective: for one reason, possibly key cells could
be destroyed, and for another, this would increase the
incentive of nations to root out their own terrorists
pronto.
> If at all possible, which might not be considering inertia of
> the political and military establishments involved, the US
> should probably try to find some non-Cl[ausewitz] way of
> retribution.
Oh, for sure. But it's hard to think of one, and one indeed
might not exist in this scenario.
Lee
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