From: Technotranscendence (neptune@mars.superlink.net)
Date: Tue Aug 06 2002 - 05:34:20 MDT
On Sunday, August 04, 2002 2:46 PM Lee Corbin lcorbin@tsoft.com wrote:
>>> This urge to seek foundations has three bad effects
>>>
>>> 1. it greatly increases the amount of bullshit
>>> 2. it speaks to math-envy, or attempts to build
>>> on axioms and to strive for Euclidean rigor
>>> 3. it is characteristically unevolutionary
>>>
>>> By 1, I mean the literally endless propositionalizing,
>>> terminological
>>> disputes, and creation of new theories.
>>
>> That's just part of life. Also, pancritical rationalism does not
>> promise to end that -- or, at least, Popper, Bartley, Campbell, et
>> al.
>> don't seem to promise that. (If they do, I don't recall reading in
>> their works where they, so please give me the references or your
>> interpretation.
>
> Why, no. You recall that I was the one who pointed out the wasted
> verbiage making CR into PCR. The PCR reading I really like is its
> explanations of phenomena in terms of evolutionary like processes.
> Not the endless quibbling.
I don't think any particular stance is going to stop people from
quibbling. But my reaction to that is: So what? Let people quibble.
Big deal.
However, if, by your lights, it's wasted, than why not stick with
critical rationalism?:)
>> The endless declaration of the death of
>> philosophy or of postphilosophy seem a bit exaggerated, pretentious,
>> and
>> even lacking in perspective, don't you think?)
>
> Oh yes. I don't object in principle to people's attempts to try
> to set everything up on axiomatics, or to engage in a lot of hair-
> splitting. I'm just (a) not interested in it and (b) don't think
> it important.
Axiomatics does not equal philosophy, nor does hairsplitting. There
are, granted, philosophies that are that way -- Cartesian Rationalism
comes to mind -- but to conflate them with philosophy is like arguing
that all mammals are really whales. The axiomatic method is just one
method of many and not all philosophies endorse it. Nor do all of them
use it in the same way. (E.g., Austrian economists (and philosophers)
like von Mises tend to mean by axioms something much more limited than
full blown axioms as used in first philosophy. They mean just the
basics in any subject. These basics for one subject would not be
derived in that subject, but outside of it would be subject to analysis
and derivation.)
>>> Pan-Critical Rationalism (or whatever we want to call it)
>>> rests on the idea of evolutionary epistemology, that we
>>> come to know things by our brains making conjectures about
>>> the nature of the outside world. Indeed, an organism itself
>>> can be viewed as a conjecture, or a guess, made by its genes
>>> in the same way that genetic algorithms operate by making
>>> guesses.
>>
>> Ah, look at the assumptions here. First of all, how do you know of
>> an
>> outside world? How do you know conjectures match against it?
>
> Because I have common sense, because I'm practiced getting results
> from the outside world just like any auto mechanic, hair stylist,
> farmer, detective, teacher, newspaper delivery boy, and
> finger-painting
> five year old. The little kid tries some colors, gets some effects,
> tries other things, gets yelled at.
Then you implicitly accept my foundation of sense perception.:)
> Back in the 20th century it wasn't moronic to question the
> existence of an "outside world"
Actually, the questioning of such started long before the 20th century
and continues to this day.
> because people were saddled
> with positivism and all sorts of other garbage. But I don't
> think that it's productive now to ask "how do you know of an
> outside world?". We have a whole web of belief, and while I
> realize that you want to *base* some things on "sense
> perception", that's not IMO a sensible way to go about it.
I maintain that it's not just some things...
> We should just start with a huge amount of interlocking
> common knowledge from baby geology to naive astronomy, most
> of which is available to every eight year old.
Okay, how does your eight year old learn about "baby geology" and "naive
astronomy" -- or any other part of this "interlocking common knowledge"?
If she reads about it in books, she's using her senses to read. Even if
her parents or teachers tell her about it, she has to use her ears to
hear and her eyes to see. Again, sense perception. (Even then, we're
only dealing here with secondary knowledge. If you tell me you're 2
meters tall, since I've never met you I'll have to take that as a
preliminary bit of information... How would I test it? By actually
measuring your height, which again would be sense perception in
action -- seeing how tall you measure against an measuring tape. Etc.)
> So forgive me if I get touchy when people remind me that
> there are solipsists "out there"! 8-) I have all
> these ancient scars from stupid discussions in the 70s.
My point in bringing this up was that I thought you were more familiar
with the pancritical rationalist material I've read, such as Bartley's
works or the collection _Evolutionary Epistemology, Rationality, and the
Sociology of Knowledge_, edited by Radnitzky and Bartley. Why would
this matter? Well, most evolutionary epistemologists and pancritical
rationalists are representationalists. This means that accept a radical
split between the mind and reality, seeing the mind as a sort of inner
theater that may or may not be related to anything outside it.
I was _not_ presenting it as an argument against pancritical
rationalism, but as one of its shakey presumptions. (I don't mean an
essential one, but ditching it would involve either becoming a complete
skeptic or embracing some form of perceptual realism. If the latter,
we're back to foundationalism.) If you don't accept
this representational view of the mind, then there's no reason to find
substitutes for observation and inductions based on observation. (This
does not entirely clear up the matter of induction, that it does remove
a major obstacle in its path. It also does not mean epistemology as a
project is complete and we can ignore it henceforth.)
>> Without a _minimal_ foundation in sense perception, you
>> have nothing for the conjecture and refutation method to
>> work against. If you already admit to knowledge of it,
>> _then_ you have a foundation -- granted, a nonpropositional
>> one, but my argument all along is for a _nonpropositional_
>> foundation.
>
> Why does everything have to be so goddamn formal? (I'm sure
> that I'm aiming at WAY MORE people than just you!) Where does
> it get us? Who needs a foundation? I don't even want to
> dignify what an eight year old knows as a "foundation",
> because then someone will ask about how well founded that
> foundation is, and on what it depends, and GRRRRRRRR
An alleged pancritical rationalist grumbles against people question
things...:)
Sense perception is pretty easy. There's nothing underneath it. It
just is. Existence exists, as Rand put it. There ain't nothing else.
Sense perception is nonpropositional, so it can't be analyzed into
further concepts or propositions. It's the foundation.
Why does one need a foundation is a good question. Since humans are
fallible -- as you point out below - -they can make mistakes in their
knowledge. They can build on the wrong ideas, which is especially easy
to do when relying on ideas and information supplied by others. (Think
about, e.g., the division of intellectual labor today. Yeah, probably
most of here have done some of the experiments Galileo and Newton did,
but probably a few just to get through Physics I. Has anyone here done
every single important experiment in science just to make sure that
Galileo, Newton, Faraday, Lavoisier, Mendel, etc. -- much less all the
minor experiments that led to the major ones? So, there's not only a
chance to make one's own mistakes to compound those made by others and
so on. Without a corrective...) Though relying on information and
ideas supplied by others is not the only mistake one can make, as any
intro to logic book shows.
> Pan Critical Rationalism rebuts justificationism and foundationism
> Moreover, here is a nice list of what PCR does taken from the
> interesting essay
> http://www.lns.cornell.edu/spr/2002-01/msg0038604.html
> (that also relates to the Bayesianism that I'd like to know more
> about in this context).
>
> (1) There are no ultimate sources of knowledge. (Human Fallibility)
See below.
> (2) All we can do is ask if an assertion is true in that it agrees
> with the facts (Cp. Tarski's Correspondence Theory of Truth).
Which means? Sense perception, no? So the ultimate authority here is
agreement with the facts, which means agreement with experience. Am I
right here?
> (3) Previously held beliefs that agreed with the facts continue to be
> held by tradition.
>
> (4) Anti-traditionalism is not important for its own sake -- in
> principle. But all tradition is open to critical examination and may
> be over thrown if found to be wrong.
Agreed.
> (5) Knowledge cannot start from nothing (i.e., not from tabula rasa)
> and knowledge cannot start from observation. The advancement of
> knowledge comes from modification and correction of earlier knowledge
> (the basis for traditional beliefs).
Knowledge of what, I would ask?:)
> (6) Neither knowledge nor reason is beyond criticism (nor are they
> sources of ultimate authority).
See above.
> (7) Absolute precision is impossible. Definitions and meanings lead
> to the fallacy of infinite regress, therefore cannot be important.
Not so. Absolute precision might be impossible (how would you know
this?), but definition and meaning are not -- unless one assumes
definition and meaning can only be absolutely precise. You're
cardstacking here. You're loading all sorts of bad traits into the
views your argue against to make your case.
Also, it's often the quest for clearer defintions and meanings that
leads to progress in science and mathematics. (See, e.g., Penelope
Maddy's _Naturalism in Mathematics_.) If, e.g., no one really cared
about the precession of Mercury or the Ultraviolet Catastrophe -- if
they argued, "No theory will ever be precise, so we need not bother
trying to make things any more clear..." -- we probably wouldn't have
had any progress in science 100 years ago. Heck, if this were the
reigning view in science, there probably never would have been enough
precision or detail to notice such problems to begin with.
Good definitions have other qualities too, but I think this is a good
starting point and I don't want this long reply to get even longer and
more delayed. Perhaps we can start a separate thread on this, though
you might label that as useless quibbling. (I think it is not, but it
is so basic that many intro to reasoning texts go over it, such as David
Kelley's _The Art of Reasoning_.)
> Clarity is achieved by understanding illustrative examples. (Ostensive
> definitions, examples, etc.)
While I've nothing against impredicative definitions, it's not the be
all do all of definition. In fact, impredicative definition is usually
what you do when you have no other means of defintion. Giving examples
alone leads only so far.
Defintion itself is a wide area, which would cover a huge, long debate
here -- chances are one we would not settle for a long time if ever --
but some key points behind definition used correctly are in order.
Defintions are about making things easier on us, as limited beings. (I
don't know any unlimited ones...:) It's much easier to hold a
definition in mind than to hold all the examples of it, especially since
the latter can be infinite. E.g., the definition of a real number as a
Dedekind Cut -- merely one definition -- is much better than listing the
square root of two and so forth. In fact, if you choose your examples
unwisely some might get the idea you're talking about algebraic
numbers -- the square root of two is one -- and not also transcendental
numbers -- pi is transcendental, but not algebraic. (Now, if you're
going to say definition works well in math, but not outside it, use the
example of mammal again. If I listed out just a few select mammals --
all I could really do in any practical discussion -- you might come to
think I only mean that subset of mammals. What if I said, "By 'mammal'
I mean, for instance, a whale."? You might come to think I mean a
large, pelagic organism. That category could be as limited as whales or
as broad as to include whale sharks, giant squids, and some of the
larger extinct reptiles of long ago.)
> (8) Every solution creates new problems. This makes our knowledge
> finite and our ignorance not only intractable but also infinite -- in
> principle. (Fruitfulness)
I don't disagree.
> (9) The above numbered theses are open to criticism (Bartley's
> Pan-Critical Rationalism)
>
> Well (continues Lee), I disagree with (5), and see no especial
> utility in points (8) and (9). But I really like the spirit of
> the whole, and that's why, to the extent of my limited knowledge,
> I'm a fan of PCR.
I'm glad you disagree with 5. Humans do seem to start off tabula
rasa -- at least, in terms of conceptual knowledge.
>> Instead, let's look for the genetic roots of all ideas --
>> of all arguments. (By "genetic" here I mean that which gives rise
>> to
>> them -- not genetics in terms of DNA or anything like that. After
>> all,
>> DNA, etc. would then have to be taken as foundational -- a position
>> I do
>> not take.) This is akin to what David Saum calls "Rand's question."
>> The question is, "What gives rise to this idea?" -- or "What
>> necessitates it?" (I'm paraphrasing here.) What does this mean?
>> Well,
>> if I have an idea, such as "X is a Y," I have to have an idea of
>> what an
>> X is and what a Y is -- at least, some minimal conception. For
>> instance, if I say "The sky is blue," the statement -- proposition,
>> if
>> you want to make it formal:) -- is meaningless if I don't know what
>> "sky" and "blue" are. The statement depends on them having
>> meanings --
>> however vague or imprecise these might be.
>
> Okay, so ideas have roots (there is a history of ideas, development,
> etc.),
> and word usages build up, there is etymology, and words have meanings.
There's a difference between a word and an idea. Also, etymological
development is different from logical development. For example, the
words "unicorn" and "demon" have an etymology, but they really don't
have logical and causal roots in the same way as "horse," "sky," and
"blue" do. The latter actually do pick out real entities or traits of
real entities on some level. The former do not.
So, this is not quibbling that words have a history. If it were, it
would be purely academic. The point Saum was making is that Rand's
question forces us to see if our ideas are grounded in facts or if
they're just floating abstractions. This is kind of like forming a
concept of something, including giving it a working definition, then
afterward making sure you have no erred by seeing if it picks out real
things on some level and makes the proper distinctions. (Of the latter,
defining 'whale' as a 'swimming animal' places it in the same category
as shrimp, shark, squid, and water snake. Thus, such a definition needs
revision given our knowledge of such other swimming animals.)
>> Now, with pancritical rationalism, as I've said in my short article,
>> pancritical rationalism presupposes a lot of logic and even sense
>> perception. (If you deny sense perception -- and accepting it to me
>> does not mean you're a naive realist -- then what does pancritical
>> rationalism have to work on? At best, merely internal coherence,
>> which
>> works for theology, but not science or any philosophy worthy of the
>> name.)
>
> Your beef is with all this "presupposing", and I say nuts to that.
> I'll go back to the eight year old. He's got a little apriori
> knowledge IMO and, more importantly, has picked up a lot of
> what's going on in the world, and what's true (along with
> some stuff that's false.) I'm uninterested in whether or not
> this "presupposes" anything. Sorry.
The eight year old got his knowledge through using sense perception. If
sense perception did not work, then she or he could not even read and
trust what was read. So, this knowledge does presuppose that. Also, if
you just want to say the eight year old knows stuff, this, in itself,
does not tell us much. She or he probably also believes a lot of untrue
things -- as many eight year olds I know believe in God, think that
heavier objects fall faster, and often believe Mom and Dad to be near
omniscient.
Rand's question here would lead the eight year old to question many of
these concepts and see where they're grounded. (Granted, there's
usually no need to do this with every single idea one has -- nor is it
error free. One could make a mistake with looking for the groundings --
just as one can make a mistake trying to falsify a scientific theory.
That's just life -- and not a strong argument against Rand's question or
Popper's falsification.)
>> Taking the genetic argument above, you need to even explain
>> evolution.
>> Evolution itself is not primary -- in either the ontological or
>> epistemological senses of the word.
>
> Perhaps here we have our basic disagreement: I don't think
> it's wise to regard anything as "primary". And you do, eh?
My point is not that I'm a foundationalist -- something I've never had a
problem with -- but that pancritical rationalism is also covertly
foundational. Foundations by any other name...
Cheers!
Dan
http://uweb.superlink.net/neptune/MyWorksBySubject.html
See my brief reaction to pancritical rationalism at:
http://uweb.superlink.net/neptune/PCR.html
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Sat Nov 02 2002 - 09:15:55 MST