From: Giu1i0 Pri5c0 (g2002@prisco.info)
Date: Tue Jun 25 2002 - 11:03:25 MDT
This is in reply to the very interesting note of Chris Bullsmith and all following messages in the thread. Chris has I think very strong arguments against the "naive" hope of survival by uploading.
Yes this topic comes back every now and then but I believe it is always interesting to explore new angles.
I think the key issue is the definition of identity: what is "me". I know what being me feels like, and I am happy with the definition of identity "me" = "something that feels like it is me". Until proof of the contrary, I also believe that "me" can be achieved by an information processing system with suitable features, sufficient complexity, and access to a large subset of the information (memories and relevant programs) stored in my brain.
Now suppose that some future high resolution equivalent of MRI scanning permits non-destructively acquiring the required information. Then you can run a copy while I am still alive, and nothing prevents you from running the copy on multiple target systems. So I think we have to admit splitting of consciousness: a consciousness stream splitting into many, or multiple consciousness streams that are identical until a point and then start diverging (the two interpretation are equally valid if there is no way to tell one from the other, and writing this I realize that there may be an interesting analogy with QM interpretations).
Which copy is me? I think that all copies are me.
Chris: suppose last night aliens have taken your sleeping body to their spaceship, copied the information in your brain, uploaded it to a biological body identical to the original one, destroyed the original body, and put the new one back in your bed perhaps with memories of dreams. Can you be absolutely sure that it is not the case? Would it make any difference to you if it were the case?
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