From: Samantha Atkins (samantha@objectent.com)
Date: Wed Jun 19 2002 - 16:08:49 MDT
Lee Corbin wrote:
> Hal writes
>
>
>>Lee writes:
>>
>>>We all know the basic difference, apparent every day of our lives,
>>>between static representations and dynamically changing ones over
>>>time. We never suppose a frozen state, or even a sequence of frozen
>>>states, to be conscious or to be experiencing anything. So where does
>>>this bizarre notion that appears to afflict you and Greg Egan that
>>>a large enough number of separate patterns---say separate integers---
>>>take on any sort of dynamism? For me, since no information flows
>>>between dead and passive structures, they're not alive.
>>
>>Actually I was not claiming this, and I don't think my argument depends
>>on it. My claim was only that computer programs and even executions of
>>programs exist in the same abstract sense that numbers and geometric
>>shape exists.
>
>
> First, your argument as to what? (your first sentence)?
>
> Second, programs and their executions are elementarily equivalent
> to integers, and so for mathematical realists exist as much as
> integers do.
>
I don't think so for much the same reason that the set of real
numbers is not equivalent to integers. Programs are not
standalone. At best you get program, relevant environment pairs
to consider.
>
>>I am undecided on the issue of whether "passive" data
>>could have the same properties.
>>However I can make two arguments in favor of that idea, even though I am
>>not fully persuaded by them. The first is to think of the universe as a
>>four-dimensional space-time continuum. One of the ideas from relativity
>>theory is that time is a fourth dimension...
>
>
> Yes, I've been struggling for about two decades to try to
> get a handle on exactly how a static four-dimensional world
> is different (if it is) from our 3+1 world insofar as these
> questions concerning consciousness arise.
>
>
>>So, here is a structure which is (in a sense) static and yet it does
>>contain conscious entities. So this might give us some reason to think
>>that static entities can contain consciousness if they have the right
>>kind of internal structure.
>
>
> Leaving alone higher dimensionality, we could wonder the same
> thing about a three dimensional object. Consider a rock in
> my hand. By *forcing* interpretations, it is possible to find
> any pattern in there at all, and to find sequences of any
> patterns we choose, e.g., conscious entities. One possible
> escape (showing *my* prejudice!) is to point out that forced
> interpretations require too much input from the forcer, and
> that the real information starts to reside in the person
> holding the rock (i.e. the person forcing such interpretation)
> and very little in the rock itself.
>
Shades of Permutation City.
> I don't see anything philosophically new here. First, we know that
> Conway's Life can contain conscious entities provided that some
> computer actually computes succeeding generations from preceding
> generations. We believe so because this is exactly equivalent to
> computer operation which is commonly accepted (here!) to be able
> to support uploading.
>
> So as in last year's discussions, imagine a plastic gel that
> *explicitly* depicts a Life generation, and then lay a succession
> of gels on top of that which depict subsequent generations. (Here
> since the representation is so explicit, we avoid my earlier
> criticism of "forcing" interpretations.)
>
> We now have a large cube that is isomorphic to, say, someone's
> last five minutes of conscious experience. Don't exactly the
> same questions arise for it?
>
> What I want to know is "How explicit is the cause and effect
> that connects the gels?". Notions of causality aren't so
> easy to deal with themselves, so far as I know. I wonder if
> philosophers have made any headway in the past couple of
> decades. Anyway, the "causality" linking the gels together
> isn't apparent to me! No more than a single 1-dimensional
> slice of Wolfram's CA is causally connected to the next
> 1-dimensional slice. Again, to be meaningful to me, they
> have to actually execute.
>
Try doing the game of Life in 3 or 3+1 D to start with.
> Perhaps we have the following philosophic continuum:
>
> 1 - everyday life in which only people are conscious
I would argue about many other species also.
> 2 - consciousness presumed in some possible computer programs
> (e.g. a particular run of a Life implementation)
Given since from a certain POV this world is a long computation.
> 3 - consciousness and experience imputed to passive objects
> of the right kind, like stacks of gels, or detailed
> pictures of Wolfram CAs.
Real CAs are not "passive" but are rather reactive and
interactive. A picture of a CA may be a picture of one state of
such a "consciousness" but is no more itself conscious than a
picture of me is.
> 4 - experience and consciousness extended to sequences of
> physical objects having precise and detailed structure
> isomorphic to possible conscious entities. These need
> not even be in each others proximity, such as patterns
> of dust throughout the cosmos
No connectivity and interaction probably corresponds to no
consciousness across the structures.
> 5 - extension of consciousness, feeling, and experience to
> completely abstract entities, such as enormous integers
> or real numbers.
Same comment.
>
> To me, the whole purpose of philosophy is prescription. I want
> to know what to do in various circumstances. For example, how
> should I value my life if I have to choose between living here
> and uploading? If some program, say a friend of mine, has
> undergone a lot of pain, does re-running good runs he had help
> him at all, or compensate for his unpleasantness? Should I
> vigorously oppose the execution of programs which experience
> pain, on the grounds that it doesn't matter whether they've
> been run before?
>
I hardly see the point of the entire question. A life program
run again under different conditions and environment may be
interesting. Running it under exactly the same conditions is
boring.
> Lee
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