From: Smigrodzki, Rafal (SmigrodzkiR@msx.upmc.edu)
Date: Tue Jun 18 2002 - 08:40:33 MDT
An excellent analysis!
Lee Daniel Crocker wrote:
- The "public goods" argument: Because exclusion is difficult and/or
expensive, shifting the cost of exclusion from the producer to the
government alleviates the "free rider" problem. This is similar to the
argument for national defense, for example: since we can't reasonably
exclude non-payers from the benefits of national defense, we make them
pay by taxation. This assumes that the item in question has some
inherent value; i.e., we are shifting the cost of exclusion to the
government whether or not there's been any demonstration that the work
we're protecting has any value--the government protects the copyrights
of works nobody wants, too. 99% of patents, for example, are pure crap,
but we pay for the administration anyway despite deriving no benefit.
### The argument you provide is indeed IMO the best for IP in general but
not necessarily in its current form. You also point out that IP as practiced
now is quite wasteful and rigid (a typical fault of statist, bureaucratic
methods). What would you think about the following modification: the state
as a provider of violent deterrence signs a contract with a party (the
author) in possession of a non-disseminated piece of information (meaning
they have the only copy, for example right after finishing the recording of
a song or developing a drug). The contract stipulates that the state will
forcibly prevent others from using that piece of information without the
author's permission, in exchange for a fee. The fee depends on the number of
legally made copies (the more copies, the tougher enforcement, the higher
fee), elapsed time (the longer you wait, the more difficult enforcement, the
higher fee), and author's selling price (the higher price, the more
difficult enforcememt, the provider asks for a higher percentage). There is
a time and copy limit on the contract. This arrangement would reward authors
who quickly disseminate their works, provide high value (if users are
willing to pay more for a copy, the author can afford to pay the enforcement
fee longer, presumably with important inventions all they way to the limits
of copy number and time limit, but with pulp fiction it would be better to
sell cheap, and quick). The general contract limits and fee schedule might
be set to maximize state profit - thus assuring that the maximum of service
is provided to the end-users. What do you think?
--------
- The "inadequate production" argument: Without the benefit of
copyrights
and patents, we wouldn't have sufficient quantity of creative works.
This argument lacks any way of determining what a "sufficient" quantity
is, and also ignores the quality of the work produced. I personally
believe that copyrights and patents don't increase the quantity of
creative
work as a whole, they just shift it from small incremental improvements
and derivatives to more speculative heavy-investment forms of creation.
### See above. Especially the profit maximization should be useful in
maximizing production.
------
- The "moral rights"/"social contract" argument: We believe that making
a
competing business to an author or inventor using his ideas or
derivatives
of them is morally wrong, and we agree as a society to enforce that.
This
is probably where most people today are, even though that bears no
resemblance to the origins of copyright (which are more along the lines
of "inadequate production").
### I am not buying this one.
Rafal
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