From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Tue Jun 18 2002 - 01:38:11 MDT
Damien writes
> At 11:27 PM 6/17/02 -0700, Lee wrote:
>
> >The *reason* why ideal triangles exist is because they
> >have identifiable non-arbitrary properties. Each one
> >has a circumcenter (etc.)... All these relations and
> >properties exist just as surely as you and I exist.
>
> Not a chance. Surely `they' have properties that are *identifiable*;
okay, we agree so far
> the properties we gather together using these tags or signifiers
> are *attributed* to a notional entity or signified.
Been hitting the ol' lit crit again, eh? Is there another
way of saying that? What is a "notional" entity? And how
do they differ from entities which are not notional?
> We don't *intuit the essence* of some *supra-actual Thing*
> in Platospace, triggered by the crippled triangular
> instantiation in front of us or inside our cognitive
> mapping.
Well I say we do, so there!
If there are people living in M31 (Andromeda), and they
ever think about triangles, then they quickly arrive at
exactly the same information that we have, and come to
learn exactly those very same properties.
If they think about 2^16 - 1, then they discover just
as we do that it's prime.
Now how can all that happen unless our thinking is
under *exactly* the same constraints that theirs is?
Those constraints really exist, and are universal.
Acknowledging their existence can either be done obliquely
(as I have done) or by metaphorically granting them a
plane of existence (which I admit is sort of abusive).
But whether we call it a (abstract) world of constraints,
or "just limits", they exist---and objectively exist---
nonetheless.
Lee
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